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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the problems confronting the decision-makers
today as they are forced to .2ke tough budgetary decisions affecting the
U.S. national security posture. Due to the dramatic changes occurring
throughout the world, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Soviet '-nrl,.
there is growing pressure upon Congress to reduce defense expenditures
and realize a "peace dividend." The danger to U.S. national security lies not
within the cuts themselves, but rather, within arbitrary budget cuts
implemented to appease the American public and realize a quick "peace
dividend." Both the executive and legislative branches of government must
consider the impact of current changes in defense spending on the lo;±g-
range U.S. defense posture. This first requires a consensus between both
branches of government on exactly what the future U.S. defense stategy
should be, a dilemma made more difficult due to their political differences.
The planning methods used by the Office of Management and Budget and the
Department of Defense must become more realistic, and the budgetary
perspective and practice of Congress must become more long-range in scope.
The U.S. must learn to operate more efficiently with less resources, while
maintaining an adequate U.S. national security posture.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The following chapters will examine the problems
associated with the current budget process, and outline
specific proposals which are important for improving the
current system. The study begins with a brief introduction
into the current budget process, an examination of the future
international environment, and the threats to U.S. national
security associated with tne budget-making process. Chapter
two will address specific problems with the current budget
process that affects the U.S. national security posture, and
chapter three will outline specific corrective action for
those problems.
All of the problems which will be discussed are not, in
the slightest degree, expected to be abolished over night.
Likewise, the corrective concepts proposed are not expected
to be easily implemented. In fact, because of the indigenous
divergence of opinions present in a pluralistic democracy such
as ours, it tends to be more difficult for the political
leadership to attain a consensus on problems, such as what
must be done to improve the budget process, or implement
measures to correct deficiencies in its own process.
This point was so vividly epitomized during the budget
negotiations at the end of FY-90, when Congressional leaders
were forced to try to reach an agreement on a plan to cut the
federal deficit prior to October ist, at which time mandatory
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (G-R-H) cuts were to take effect. Even
though the leadership of Congress reached an agreement with
the executive branch, the full conqressional membership still
rejected the proposal.
The necessary changes will be difficult to implement,
however, the importance of the need for change has already
become very apparent to the political leadership and the
American public. America's patience with fickle governmental
policy and process is deteriorating. Changes must be made
within government, either through procedural adjustments or
simply a more personal awareness, and therefore, modification
of behavior, by members of Congress. Hopefully, some small
contribution toward improving the system may be realized
through the efforts of this paper.
A. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE CURRENT BUDGET PROCESS
1. The Budget: To Whom Does The Responsibility Belong?
There is nothing more fundamental to the power of the
legislative branch than the concept of the "power of the
purse." It is the essence of strength from which the Congress
has operated since the U.S. Constitution was placed in power.
It takes money to function in society, and governmental
matters are no different.
Congress was granted the "power of the purse" in
Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution as stated, "To
2
lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, tc pay
the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States."' The founding fathers gave the
House of Representatives predominant control over federal
spending primarily because they better represented the
populace. James Madison, in defending the system in The
Federalist, No. 58, argued that:
this power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the
most complete and effectual weapon with which any
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the
people.
2
By regulation and allocation of governmental spending through
the budgetary process Congress has enormous power over the
governmental system.
There are a number of citizens within the mass public
who believe the government operates with an unlimited supply
of money. These people are unaware of the very real budget
by which the government operates, and become disturbed when
there is talk of possible program cutbacks which may affect
their livelihood. Nothing will arouse the mass public's fury
faster than speculation of possible cutbacks in Medicare,
Social Security, employment opportunity, or other programs
that may affect their pocketbook. The elected representatives
1The Constitution of the United States.
2 Quoted in W. Thomas Wander, F. Ted Hebert, and Gary W.
Copeland, Congressional Budgeting: Politics, Process, and
Power (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press,
1984), pp. 57-58.
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in Washington know the special interest groups will ensure
they receive word of such cuts as quickly as possible. Herein
lies the volatility of the budgetary process as it concerns
the civilian sector. This point must be understood and kept
in mind when discussing the budget's affect on defense
structure and policy, especially when it impacts civilian
programs.
The U.S. Government became much more involved in the
country's economy with the enactment of the Full Employment
Act of 1946. This legislation institutionalized the Roosevelt
administration's "New Deal." Basically the legislation stated
the government has a responsibility to strive to maintain full
employment. It was assumed the government could influence the
economy in one of three ways to achieve this goal: (1) control
over the interest rates; (2) manipulation of taxation; and (3)
regulation of governmental spending. It was believed these
j
three tools would allow the government to control the publics
propensity to save and invest.
Two organizations were formed to assist in the task.
T.ie first was the Council of Economic Advisors which was
formed to monitor the economy and brief the President on the
status of employment. The other was the Joint Economic
Committee of the Congress which was designed to investigate
the economy in a micro-economic view. This legislation placed
even more pressure on the legislative and executive branches
by placing the responsibility for employment in their hands.
4
The most recent major reform of the budgetary process
was the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Due to the immense
power granted Congress with respect to budgetary matters, it
is understandable that tensions might surface from time to
time as a result of the allocation of resources. These
tensions surface most frequently between the executive and
legislative branches of government. Prior to 1974, only five
periods of major reform to the congressional budget process
can be identified:
• the creation of the appropriations committees after the
Civil War;
" the dispersal of the appropriations power in the House
between 1877 and 1885;
* the dispersal of the appropriations power in the Senate
in 1899;
* the consolidation of the appropriations power in the House
(1920) and the Senate (1922);
" the creation of the legislative budget and the Joint
Budget Committee in 1946.
3
The fact there have been so few major reforms over the years
indicates the strength of the budgetary system, but also that
tensions in the system have been resolved primarily through
minor adjustments vice major reforms.
3W. Thomas Wander, F. Ted Hebert, and Gary W. Copeland,
ConQressional BudQeting: Politics, Process, and Power
(Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press,
1984), 3&4.
5
To understand the necessity for reform in 1974 one
must examine the economy between World War II and the early
1970's. Without an examination of specific details, let us
suffice to say the U.S. economy, with the exception of the mid
1960's, was confronted with growing fiscal deficits, as a
result of post war recovery and the Vietnam conflict, and
fluctuation of inflation rates. Not wanting to take the
blame, the executive and legislative branches were content to
point the finger in the opposite direction. Unfortunately
this finger pointing battle usually ended with the President
receiving favorable attention and Congress holding the smoking
gun. This was not too surprising since the Congress, as
directed by the U.S. Constitution, is in charge of the
nation's budget and ultimately responsible.
In the early 1970's President Nixon rubbed salt in the
wound by publicly attacking Congress for causing the increase
in the national deficit, inflation, and unemployment from 1969
through 1971. He also attempted to encroach on Congress'
"power of the purse" by suggesting the President should decide
program cutbacks.
In attempting to place the blame for past and current
economic ills on Congress and in trying to wrest control
of spending decisions away from Congress, the Nixon
administration was striking at the fundamental legislative




Congress realized it was in a losing war with the "Imperial
Presidency." The executive branch was infringing on Congress'
purse power and must be contained. Reforms were needed to
check and constrain the executive branches' influence over
fiscal policy.
5
The purpose of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
was to restore to Congress control over governmental spending.
Because of the new legislation, Congress was forced to clt
serious about budgetary matters. In the past they were
content to voice their objection to the executive branch for
infringing on their responsibility, however, now that they had
won the fight they were confronted with the reality of
actually performing the job. The legislation required
Congress to adopt two budget resolutions each year which would
coordinate taxing and spending policies by including
recommended levels of revenues and expenditures. They were
also tasked with establishing priorities for spending among
nineteen functional areas.
Congress realized the necessity to "get smart" on
budgetary matters. Therefore, the Congressional Budget Act
lead to the establishment of the Congressional Budget Office
5The executive branch actually began accumulating their
influence in the early 20th century when Congress began to
encounter difficulties in handling the budget. These
difficulties were caused by complications in the budget as the
country developed and became more complex. This lead to the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1920, which was an attempt by
Congress to place the burden of developing a budget on its
primary user, the executive branch.
7
(CBO). Congress recognized they lacked the expertise needed
regarding the economy and budget. In the past they relied on
the executive branch, particularly the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), to furnish the necessary information.
The CBO was tasked with collecting data regarding the
economy and budget solely for the use of Congress. The CBO
would also serve to checkmate the OMB, it's counterpart in the
executive branch. In addition each house created its own
budget committee, which would recommend the budget resolution
to the whole body and would employ a sizable professional
staff. The Office of Technical Assessment (OTA) was another
specialized office organized to judge whether particular
issues, primarily defense and energy related, are feasible and
warrant further consideration. A side benefit of this major
reform has been the renewed interest and extra emphasis placed
on the budget by Congress.
The responsibility for the United States budget rests
with the Congress! The blame can be placed with no other
department of government. There are some uninformed members
of the mass public who still believe the President is
responsible for governmental spending, and therefore, the poor
fiscal condition of the country.
During August and September, President Bush launched
an offensive against Congress, particularly its Democratic
leadership, to inform the American people of Congress'
rightful responsibility for the budget. The President
8
recognized that due to the effect mandatory Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings budget cuts would have on the livelihood of many
Americans, which were to automatically begin October 1, the
public should know the right direction to point their finger.
2. Civilian Control Over Defense
The essence of policy making is budget making. The
policy programs and goals of administrations must be funded
to be placed into operation. Therefore, it can be said:
budget determines strategy. As all citizens of this great
capitalistic society know, money is power. The person who
controls the money controls the power, and as we have
discussed in the United States the civilian Congress controls
the money. Ferdinand Eberstadt stated:
The budget is one of the most effective, if not the
strongest, implements of civilian control over the
military establishment.6
From a military perspective this is all too true, however,
there are those who feel it is a necessary check of our
governmental system.
Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense for the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations, was one who strongly advocated
the necessity of civilian control of the military. General
Curtis E. 'eMay was probably McNamara's strongest antithesis
as Chief of Staff of the Air Force during McNamara's term.
6Quoted in Arnold Kanter, Defense Politics: A Budgetary
Perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979),
6.
9
McNamara did not believe the civilian control of the
armed forces was necessary due to constitutional reasons. He
actually believed the military and its leaders were somewhat
incapable of making the proper decisions concerning defense,
primarily because he felt they would always tend to be biased
in their decisions. He strongly felt the military leaders'
solution to international problems, or domestic issues such
as the budget, would always result in a solution to strengthen
the military through an enhancement of their position, or
further justification for their existence. His reluctance to
solicit and utilize the advice and recommendations of the
military was the reason McNamara was contested most by LeMay.
Speaking on this subject LeMay wrote:
I AM well aware that political considerations can, do, and
must transcend military ones when formulating national
policy. . . . My quarrel is with those who usurp the
military professional's position--those who step in front
of him and who volunteer and enforce strictly military
advice and guidance with little knowledge of or experience
in such matters. These are the men who have endangered
America. . . . As soon as a man in uniform questions the
competence of any civilian to make military judgements,
he is charged out of hand with questioning the virtue of
civilian control of the military. This is an unfair
charge. 7
Throughout both LeMay's and McNamara's careers in
Washington there existed an ambience of disparity between the
two due to philosophical differences in defense strategies.
As General LeMay was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, this
7Curtis E. LeMay, America Is in Danqer (New York: Funk &
Wagnalls, 1968), 1 (emphasis in original).
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friction was between one of the top military officers in the
country, and the top civilian executive of the Department of
Defense (DoD). Of course, McNamara prevailed in all major
disagreements. This example points out an important element
in the complicated defense budget formulation process. As
civilian administrations and their associated structure and
policies change, so changes defense structure and policies by
virtue of their hierarchy over the military.
The Kennedy-Johnson era presents a good example.
Prior to President Kennedy, the Eisenhower administration was
criticized for it's failure to utilize the budget system and
achieve a coordinated defense structure. Their defense budget
was concerned with arbitrary ceilings in spending for each of
the services without much thought of how the spending related
to defense strategy and weapon systems. Eisenhower was more
concerned with how much money was spent, rather than for what
it bought.
As a result each of the services had their own
priorities for spending, attempting to prove the necessity of
their respective department as the primary tool for national
defense, and in this particular period, deterrence as well.
In many instances weapon systems were being developed by all
services which were similar in design and purpose, but only
designed for different modes of employment.
The Kennedy administration recognized the previous
administration's wasteful practices of defense spending and
11
vowed to take a more economical approach. President Kennedy
did not intend to cut back on the defense budget. Quite the
contrary, he only wished to ensure the money allocated was
being spent wisely. In his last State of the Union message
to Congress, Kennedy stated:
This country, therefore, continues to require the best
defense in the world--a defense which is suited to the
sixties. This means, unfortunately, a rising defense
budget--for there is no substitute for adequate defense,
and no "bargain basement" way of achieving it. . . . For
threats of massive retaliation may not deter piecemeal
aggression--and a line of destroyers in a quarantine, or
a division of w~lJ-equipped men on a border, may be more
useful. to our real security than the multiplication of
awesome weapons beyond all rational need. . . . While we
shall never weary in the defense of freedom, neither shall
we abandon the pursuit of peace.
8
An example of how changes in the decision-making
process or administration will produce changes in policy can
be found in the Kennedy administration. Kennedy selected
Robert McNamara for the job of shaping up and stream-lining
the defense budget. At the time of his selection as Secretary
of Defense, Robert McNamara was President of Ford Motor
Company, and prior to World War II he had taught at the
Harvard School of Business Administration. He had an
impressive business background.
To accomplish the task before him he developed the
"Planning-Programming-Budgeting System," or PPBS. The PPBS
was designed to first identify the requirements for defense
8John F. Kennedy, The State of the Union Messages of the
Presidents: 1790-1966, Volume III 1905-1966 (New York: Chelsea
House Publishers, 1967), 3153.
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strategy, and then ensure the defense system as a whole was
organized to meet those requirements. PPBS assumed:
" forces should be structured by tasks, not organizational
interests;
" costs should be measured in relation to benefits;
" alternative methods of accomplishing objectives should be
capable of evaluation;
" short-term planning should reflect long-term goals;
" the Secretary of Defense should have the capacity (and the
staff) to make such judgements independently of the
individual services.
9
Simplified, PPBS was intended to eliminate the
wasteful spending practices of the previous administration,
while at the same time producing a more economically credible
defense force. There were to be no more predetermined budget
limits. Decisions were to be made concerning defense programs
rather than budgets. The system was designed to eliminate
the duplication of similar weapon systems among the services.
The original concept developed by McNamara was very good,
however, because of the inconsistencies within the operating
styles of administrations over the years, the original
aspirations of PPBS have not been realized (the PPBS system
will be discussed further in chapter two).
The budget process is a powerful force capable of
exercising considerable influence on the U.S.' national
9john Lewis Gaddis, Strateuies of Containment (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982), 225-226.
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security posture. To fully understand its importance and
influence within the international system, one should examine
the role of economics within the future international
environment.
B. THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The future international environment is one of great
speculation and concern to all social scientists and students
of the field. The future structure will be more complex and
interconnected than in the past. Countries will tend to
concentrate more on international trade issues and the status
of their balance of payments. They will monitor the value of
foreign currencies and markets around the world, apprehensive
of possible implications at home.
The complexity of this interconnection will not only
revolve around economic issues, but also around a concern for
the world's future. As we progress into the final years of
the twentieth century, nations are becoming more aware of
their shared interests and dependence in the areas of ecology,
technology and other sciences.
This growing interdependence between states will continue
to have a profound affect on the division of power. A
nation's interdependence upon other nations is an important
component in determining its strength in times of crisis, and
tends to weaken the country, making it vulnerable to
14
manipulation by the powers of the world. According to Robert
0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye:
. interdependence restricts autonomy, but it is
impossible to specify a priori whether the benefits of a
relationship will exceed the costs. This will depend on
the values of the actors as well as on the nature of the
relationship. 10
Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein view interdependence in
a much more basic sense:
a relationship of interests such that if one
nation's position changes, other states will be affected
by that change.1
In the future, the concept of interdependence will bring to
mind ideas of mutual survival and new technological
discoveries around the globe.
Caution must be exercised by the world leadership to
protect the delicate stability that will accompany this
seemingly utopian environment. The increase in
interdependence throughout the system will inevitably produce
the potential for more volatility. It is only natural for
this to occur, as nations reluctantly release part of their
sovereignty as they open their doors to outside influences.
This openness relinquishes control of certain domestic affairs
which, in turn, affects the control over their own internal
stability. The natural tendency of government is to resist
10Quoted in James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff,
Contending Theories of International Relations (New York:
Harper & Row, 1981), 136.
"Ibid, 137.
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such change, which is why the transformation process will not
happen immediately.
In the future, interdependence will play a more
predominant role throughout the international structure than
any other period in history. The world will be more educated
in terms of economic and technological cooperation, a
realization of our coexistence in the same environment, and
in respect to an awareness of our capability to destroy
everything we hold precious.
The international system, in effect, is transforming from
an "actor" to a "systems" oriented structure. A bi-product
of this new international paradigm will be a restructuring of
the decision-making process throughout government. As Charles
William Maynes, editor of ForeiQn Policy magazine, recently
wrote:
the task of government is changing, and so must the
people chosen to head it. The challenge is now less
military vigilance than diplomatic change.
Economists will be more important than geopoliticians,
diplomats more critical than warriors. Multilateralists
for the first time will be more important than
bilateralists - people who understand international
financial institutions may be more valuable than people
who know the names of Salvadoran guerrilla leaders.
Experts in fields like the Pnvironment or development
may become serious candidates for major positions on the
N.S.C. or in the State Department.
12
12Charles William Maynes, "For New Foreign Policy . . .
The New York Times, 23 May 1990, A17.
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Unlike the immediate postwar period, governmental
leadership today is cognizant of the present stalemate that
exists with nuclear deterrence. They are beginning to
mutually agree on the futility of this standoff and the
horrible consequences to our shared environment if these
weapons are ever put to use. In this sense, interdependence
relates to a concerted effort on the part of both superpowers
and the remainder of the industrialized world to protect our
only source of life: planet Earth.
If the stability and rationality of the international
system is maintained, the nuclear standoff and arms control
negotiations will become less predominant an issue in summit
discussions. Evidence of such a shift can already be noticed.
Prior to the summit last May between Presidents Bush and
Gorbachev in Washington D.C., some concern was raised over
the agenda for the discussions. As Robert C. Toth of the Los
AnQeles Times wrote:
As the superpowers prepare to consider a nuclear
weapons treaty and a pact to cut conventional forces in
Europe, critics are questioning whether what is on the
table is very meaningful - or even necessary - any more.
With the Soviet bloc disintegrating, and Moscow
already pulling its troops out of Eastern Europe on its
own, the arms control negotiations are being overtaken by
events . . .13
13Robert C. Toth, "As Cold War thaws, critics question
need for arms pact," San Jose Mercury News, 28 May 1990, 18A.
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The discussions will invariably expand to include other
critical issues which are shared by the superpowers and the
world community.
However, if the stability of the international system
breaks down, there is a very real possibility of a shift back
to a tight bi-polar system similar to the postwar era. As we
progress further into the future, the possibility of this
scenario becomes less likely. Many would argue, however, that
the stability of the world has been successfully maintained
over the years because of the nuclear standoff. These people
would argue that as the world shifts into a more horizontal
diffusion of power and multi-polar blocs, the environment will
become more unstable. The potential for increased instability
is present, however, the real potential threat to world
stability lies not between the U.S. and Soviet Union in the
near term, but rather within regional disputes which may
arise, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
The decreased emphasis over concern of a future nuclear
conflict contributes to the predominant element of national
power in the future international system: economic power.
Economic power will be the primary determinant of a nation's
hierarchial pocition in the system, and the multi-polar
structure which will develop in the decade of the '90's. The
multi-polar environment will become increasingly centered
around the economic relationships between countries and
communities of countries, such as the European Economic
18
Community (EEC), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), just to name a few.
The environment will continue to shift from a position of
"every nation for himself," to a more cooperative dependence
among the nations, both in terms of economic relationships and
ecological considerations. This expanding economic
interaction may be deceiving in terms of its benefits to the
world in general, and especially to U.S. national security.
This predominant economic system of international trade will
further bind the world together in an intricate collection of
interdependencies between countries.
An analysis of international economics is, therefore, an
analysis of world power, and directly affects the manner in
which nations interact with one another. Paul Kennedy
maintained this proposition with a historical comparison which
examined the relationship between national power and a state's
economic well-being.14 Today, more than ever, the subject of
economics is in the forefront of international discussions,
negotiations and agreements, and will only continue to
increase in importance in the '90's.
In the present age where economic interdependence is
developing into a complex array of intricate trade agreements,
treaties and sanctions; which are closely monitored by
14See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
(New York: Random House, 1987; Vintage Books, 1989).
19
individual governments, multinational firms and international
investors; regional economic fluctuations now produce
significant repercussions around the world. The United
States' economy will certainly play a large part in the
delicate balance of the current world market, and its economic
well-being will further determine the U.S.' future degree of
influence as this economic system continues to develop. An
understanding of these delicate relationships is imperative!
C. THE FUTURE THREAT TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ASSOCIATED
WITH THE BUDGET-MAKING PROCESS
The heart of policy making is the budget. As Robert
McNamara stated:
: policy decisions must sooner or later be expressed
in the form of budget decisions on where to spend and how
much. 15
As administrations change so do their ideas concerning the
preeminence of policies. Even changes in administrations of
the same political party will have differences in their views
toward certain policies and programs. The more emphasis an
administration places on a particular policy issue the more
emphasis will be placed on ensuring it receives the necessary
funding.
A strong defense budget is a signal to foreign countries,
both allies and adversaries, of the U.S.' commitment to remain
15Quoted in Kanter, 5.
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strong militarily. It is the necessary backing to indicate
the intent of the U.S. to keep their promise of protection to
key allies and the rest of the free world. In February 1982
President Reagan was asked, "Why are you so strong in your
support of this additional [military] spending?" The
President replied:
In the last several years before this administration, the
military was literally starved. There is a dangerous
window of vulnerability. Even with our military buildup,
we will not even be back in the range of ability to stand
in the face of our adversaries, the Soviet Union, until
the mid-eighties. . . . But we have to show our
adversaries that we have the will to defend ourselves.
They have thought for several years we don't.
16
As pressure grows to reduce the fiscal deficit, the
greater the likelihood many politicians will opt for short-
term "quick-fixes," rather than long-term solutions to the
problems at hand. The end result of these domestic political
decisions will impact the U.S. defense posture as the
political pressure grows to cut defense spending and realize
a "peace dividend."
Although the pressure has recently become less conspicuous
as a result of the Middle East crisis, there remains a
considerable urgency to repair the U.S.' poor fiscal
16President Reagan was interviewed by Skip Weber of the
Iowa Daily Press Association in Des Moines, February 9, 1982.
Transcripts found in Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982, Volume I (Washington D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 150.
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(or The Budget's Hidden PACMEN)
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* RISING MANDATORY PROGRAM COSTS
* UNFUNDED RETIREMENT PROGRAM LIABILITIES
* RISING CLEAN UP COSTS
* RISK OF FUTURE CLAIMS FROM:
- FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS
- FEDERAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS
PEACE DIVIDEND???
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condition. As Figure 117 illustrates, the "peace dividend"
many Americans hope for will quickly be absorbed by demands
from other sectors of the economy, and likely will never be
realized in terms of its affect on the federal deficit.
Nonetheless, the problem facing the DoD and Congress is
the determination of what, and how much, should be cut from
the total U.S. budget. It is no longer a question of whether
17Donald E. Gessaman, Acting Deputy Associate Director for
National Security, Office of Management and Budget, Executive
Office of the President, interviewed by author, 23 October
1990, Washington D.C.
22
or not the cuts will be made, at this point they are
inevitable. The danger to U.S. national security lies not
within the specific requirement to reduce government
expenditures, but rather in the irrational implementation of
that requirement in order to appease the American public,
without the proper long-range consideration of their
implication to future U.S. defense strategy. Therefore, it
is critical at this point that the U.S. research methods for
cutting back on defense spending, while at the same time
preserving an adequate level of defense.
An important variable which will influence the tough
decisions on what must be cut from the budget will be, of
course, "pork-barrel" politics. Many Congressmen are quick
to support the outcry for a reduced defense budget, however,
the same are also vigilant to protect the interests of their
constituents. A good example was the proposed list of
military base closures submitted to Congress earlier this
year. Many Congressional members quickly took the defensive
"not in my district" attitude. This traditional "pork-
barrel" political posture poses the most serious threat to
U.S. national security, because it tends to force the
politician to think in terms of "what's good for the district"
or "home state," rather than on "what's good for the nation."
At a time where drastic defense reductions appear
imminent, the decisions to be made concerning what to keep and
what not to keep, must be unbiased and intelligent. It would
23
seem the most unbiased decisions could only come from the
department of government not concerned over being reelected:
the Department of Defense. Naturally, the Congress, who
ultimately holds the constitutional "power of the purse," is
reluctant to release control of such authority, especially
since that control would fall into the hands of the executive
branch and DoD.18 DoD should not be granted carte blanche with
respect to defense spending, however, a more objective process
will be required to properly decide on a long-range defense
strategy, and the associated budget necessary to achieve it.
18The Congress can be credited today with making greater
attemptc to include the Department of Defense, and more
importantly the military, in national security decisions, an
example being the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
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II. THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRENT BUDGET PROCESS
The United States is faced with a dilemma! That
perplexity is how to arrive at a consensus among the Congress
to repair the ailing fiscal health of the nation. As the
nation grows older, its capability to work cooperatively for
a common goal seems to deteriorate. It may be argued at times
that this partisanship which exists in the governmental system
is dysfunctional. However, it can also be argued quite
assertively that it serves a vital role in strengthening our
pluralistic democracy.
Today partisan politics is clouding the vision of the
elected officials in Washington, which prevents them from
taking action for the greater good of the nation. The concept
of making compromises has become an unthinkable proposition
among the legislators. This unwillingness to accept
resolutions for the overall benefit of a package, due to
particular concessions which go against personal or party
principles, impedes the enactment of legislation the nation
needs to properly conduct business. It is a weakness of the
government's solidarity, which contributes to a weakness in
its national security.
This weakness became all too evident during the budget
crisis last October. As fiscal year 1990 drew to an end,
Congress was once again confronted with the deadline of
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October ist without much promise of an acceptable resolution
for the budget. Once again, the people's representatives
could not agree on the fiscal requirements necessary to steer
the economy in the direction for a future balanced budget,
while simultaneously achieving their own personal economic
objectives and protecting their bid for reelection in
November.
Recognizing the familiar paradigm surfacing from capital
hill, the president sought to prevent the redundant pattern
from occurring, which habitually results in a temporary
solution to an aging problem. The president launched a verbal
offensive, and reprimanded Congress for not performing its
constitutional duty in a timely manner. At a news conference
on August 14th, President Bush stated:
Our current budget or lack thereof constitutes a real
threat to the economic well-being of this country. And
in this case the problem is a lack of action on the part
of the Congress, and abdication of responsibility that
endangers our economic vitality and the jobs that go with
it.
It is no secret to the American people that the
Congressional budget process has broken down.
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The President was seeking a permanent solution to the
economic problem before the nation, rather than a temporary
resolution that would only postpone significant action into
the new fiscal year. Congress requires the executive branch
to submit its federal budget proposal on time each year, the
19
"Bush News Conference On Budget and Middle East," The




January President submits budget to Congress.
February 15 CBO issues annual report to Budget
Committees.
February 25 Committees submit views and estimates to
Budget Committees.
April 15 Congress completes first concurrent budget
resolution.
June 15 Congress completes reconciliation process.
June 30 House completes action on annual
appropriations bills.
August 15 OMB and CBO estimate deficit for upcoming
fiscal year.
August 20 CBO issues its initial report to OMB and
Congress.
August 25 OMB issues its initial report to President
and Congress. President issues initial
sequester order.
September 15 Congress completes second concurrent budget
resolution.
September 25 Congress completes second and final
reconciliation process.
October 1 Fiscal year begins.
October 10 CBO submits revised report to OMB and
Congress.
October 15 OMB issues its revised report to President
and Congress. President issues final
sequester order.
Source: "'The Budget Process," ConQressional Digest
(November 1989): 261-263; and Lee D. Olvey, et al., The
Economics of National Security.
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first monday after January 3rd (see Table I), and the
executive branch consistently meets this deadline. Congress
should approve the federal budget within the same time
constraints.
Once again as the deadline approached, Congress could not
agree on a meaningful solution, and passed a continuing budget
resolution that would temporarily keep the government running
for another week. Steven Mufson and John E. Yang, of the
Washington Post, wrote of the problem:
The resounding defeat of the deficit-reduction accord
in the House . . . raises two questions: Can any package
big enough to deal with the deficit problem pass Congress,
and will anything that passes Congress be big enough to
deal with the problem?2
The president exercised his right of veto over the
continuing resolution in order to emphasize, both to Congress
and the American people, the importance of the positive
measures needed toward a reduction in the budget deficit and
control over fiscal policy. This action sent a clear signal
to the representatives that the administration was intolerant
of further postponement of the real problem before them: the
repair of the nation's economy.
The inability of Congress to reach a consensus when
dealing with national problems, such as choosing the correct
action to solve the U.S.' economic and budgetary ills, has
20Steven Mufson and John E. Yang, "As crises go, the U.S.
deficit just isn't sexy," San Jose Mercury News, 7 October
1990, 1A.
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been the subject of a number of different publications, and
the focus of research by a number of social scientists over
the years.21 The research of particular interest and relevant
to this discussion is the studies which looked into the
effective operability of group decision-making, more
specifically, its relationship to, and implications upon, a
democratic governmental system. The next few paragraphs will
focus attention on the particular work accomplished by Kenneth
J. Arrow.
Arrow addressed the difficulties in the establishment of
assimilation procedures for the various preferences of a
particular group's members. Basically, his research and
conclusions outlined the difficulties similar to those
encountered within the U.S. Congress, as 435 representatives
and 100 Senators try to represent the desires of their
respective constituents and, simultaneously, reach an
agreement on a particular piece of legislation. His procedure
was to come up with some logical criteria by which social
decisions were made, and then to examine their implications
within the process. As stated by William J. Baumol, Arrow
originally proposed the following four minimal conditions
which social choices must meet in order to reflect
individuals' preferences:
21See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II, rev. ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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• social choices must be consistent (transitive) in the
sense that if A will be decided in preference to B, and
B in preference to C, then C will not be decided in
preference to A;
" the group decisions must not be dictated by anyone outside
the community or by any one individual in the community;
" social choices must not change in the opposite direction
from the choices of the members of that society; that is,
an alternative which would otherwise have been chosen by
society must never be rejected just because some
individuals come to regard it more favorably; and
" a social decision as between two alternatives must not
change so long as no individual in the community changes
the order in which he ranks these alternatives in accord
with his preferences. In other words, the social
preference as between two alternatives, A and B, must
depend only on people's opinions of just these twc
alternatives, A and B (and not on any other alternative
which does not happen to be immediately relevant). 22
Arrow's intent was to illustrate that although the above
criteria appear to be a typical set of characteristics which
would represent or define a democratic process, the
interaction of the principles offer a much more complicated
process. He demonstrated that it is impossible tc
successfully choose between all the desires of a particular
social group without violating at least one of the above
criteria.
William J. Baumol illustrated Arrow's concept through the
use of the three diagrams shown in Figure 2. Three
individual's (Smith, Jones, and Mznch) are to choose between
22William J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations
Analysis, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1972), 405.
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THE DIFFICULTIES WITH DEMOCRATIC GROUP DECISIONS
I. A B C
Smith 3 2 1
Jones 1 3 2
Mznch 2 1 3
II. A B C D III. A C D
Smith 4 3 2 1 Smith 3 2 1
Jones 4 3 2 1 Jones 3 2 1
Mznch 2 1 4 3 Mznch 1 3 2
Total point vote 10 7 8 5 Total point vote 7 7 4
Source: William J. Baumol. Economic Theory and Operations Analsis, 3rd ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 404-408.
Figure 2
three alternatives (A, B, and C) by ranking their favorite
alternative "3," their next favorite "2," and their least
preferable alternative "1." Diagram I of Figure 2 shows that
Smith and Mznch prefer A to B, Smith and Jones prefer B to C,
and Jones and Mznch prefer C to A. Therefore, the majority
prefers A to B and B to C but it also prefers C to A. This
results in a violation of Arrow's first criteria.
In diagram II and III of Figure 2, Baumol illustrates how
alternatives which are considered unimportant in normative
decision-making (e.g., candidates who enter elections with no
:1
apparent chance of winning) can play a factor in the outcome
of choice between the remaining alternatives. In Diagram II,
alternative A wins the vote by 10 points over alternative C
with 8 points. However, as Diagram III shows, if alternative
B is dropped from consideration, A and C become equally
desired alternatives by the group.23
Arrow's research continued to point out that the situation
only becomes more complicated when personal emotion is
introduced. As Arrow's fourth criteria stated, a social
group's preference between two alternatives must depend only
on the consideration of those two alternatives. If a segment
of the group holds a deep personal sentiment, due to moral or
religious convictions, toward a particular alternative, this
consideration might affect the decision-making process in
violation of the fourth criteria.
The adversity and frustration of the democratic process
manifests itself, as one becomes familiar with the result of
Arrow's study. As William J. Baumol stated:
* * * these requirements for social choice may seem a
rather appropriate set of conditions for democratic
decision-making. However, Arrow has shown that the matter
is not so simple. . . . In other words, it would appear
that social choice must be in a sense inconsistent or
undemocratic!
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The same ineptitude which prevents Congress from reaching




its capability to work in a united fashion toward other
objectives necessary for a strong national security posture.
It is an intangible problem (as Arrow's study illustrated)
which is very difficult to define, and therefore, difficult
to diagnose a solution. It is an abstract characteristic of
our democracy which, many would argue, mikes the system
strong.
The strength of the United States throughout its history
has intensified in times of crises, due to the resolve of the
American people and their representatives in Congress to unite
and, if necessary, make sacrifices for a common goal. During
periods when America has been unable to come together as one,
such as during the Vietnam era, the weakness of the democratic
system has been very apparent. The implication of this
discord to U.S. national security is real, and significant
consequences can be identified which will only be resolved
through recognition and execution of corrective measures.
Both the executive and legislative branches of government must
be cognizant of the following deficiencies which threaten the
strength and security of the nation, especially in an era of
such sweeping change throughout the international system.
• The perception of a reduced threat to U.S. national
security, and the associated political pressure to reduce
defense spending.
" The deterioration of the U.S.' overall defense posture due
to impulsive defense cuts without a viable long-range
defense strategy.
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" The impact of cutbacks in defense spending on the already
neglected and deteriorating defense industrial base.
" The deterioration of the U.S.' technological superiority
due to cutbacks in research and development expenditures,
and through the transfer of technology to competing
countries.
A. THE POLITICAL PRESSURE TO REDUCE DEFENSE SPENDING
Today, after four decades, the international landscape is
marked by change that is breath-taking in its character,
dimension, and pace. The familiar moorings of postwar
security policy are being loosened by developments that
were barely imagined years or even months ago. Yet, our
goals and interests remain constant. And, as we look
toward--and hope for--a better tomorrow, we must also look
to those elements of our past policy that have played a
major role in bringing us to where we are today.
President George Bush
March 1990
President Bush wrote the above statement in the preface
to The White House publication, National Security Strategy of
the United States. The elements the President spoke of, which
have brought the U.S. to the position it holds today, will not
be present by the mid '90's. The growing political pressure
within the U.S. to cut back militarily, caused by the sweeping
changes in Eastern Europe and fiscal problems at home, will
cause a significant reduction in future U.S. force levels.
In a speech May 29th before the Naval Postgraduate School,
Sean O'Keefe, the Department of Defense Comptroller, said the
25The White House, National Security StrateQy of the
United States ([Washington D.C.]: The White House, March
1990), v.
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U.S. military force level of 1995 should be 75 percent of the
1985 level if current planned reductions are continued.
There is no question as to the downward trend in future
defense spending, both in terms of real dollars and as a
percentage of GNP, as long as the world remains tranquil. In
the present era of the diminished Soviet threat to the West,
competing demands for defense dollars will force politicians
to re-evaluate the resources allocated to defense. As Jacques
S. Gansler stated:
. . . there are other demands on the nation's resources-
-among them the huge national deficit; the valid calls for
a refurbishing of the nation's highways, bridges, and
harbors; the trade imbalance and the consequent need to
revitalize the nation's industrial competitiveness; and
the nation's growing needs for health care, education,
Social Security, child care, and other social measures.
Thus, an increasing number of people are questioning the
affordability of America's security posture.26
As FiQure 327 illustrates, the priorities of the American
people are changing. The possibility of war with the Soviet
Union, be it conventional or nuclear, is no longer the
preoccupation of American concerns. The anxieties of today's
population are over issues concerning the environment,
proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, social
problems, and drugs. As the interests of the people change,
26Jacques S. Gansler, AffordinQ Defense (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press, 1989), 1-2.
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so will the attention of Congress, just as our political
process was designed to operate.
The United States must be careful not to allow the
sweeping enthusiasm over "no more enemy" to lead the country
in a direction where it might find itself in a precarious
defense posture. In the committee markup of the FY91 Defense
Authorization Bill, the House Armed Services Committee wrote:
Abroad, the conventional military threat posed in Europe
by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies virtually
36
evaporated. Threats elsewhere declined as well, although
none so dramatically.
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The report was released 31 July 1990, and a week later the
U.S. £uund itsclf as:ambli.ig the largest warfighting force
since Vietnam in the deserts of Saudi Arabia. No event could
have done more to drive the point home, both to the American
legislators and people, of the potential for unforeseen events
that may suddenly occur and threaten the U.S.' vital
interests. Saddam Hussein may have done more to prevent the
dangerous deterioration of the U.S.' national defense posture,
than the U.S. proponents of a strong national defense force
could have accomplished in a decade.
If history has taught America any "one" lesson, it should
be that in every instance where the U.S. has thought it
possible to demobilize and capitalize on the "peace dividend,"
it has found itself later in a position necessary to re-arm.
As will be addressed below, the Soviet military is undergoing
change which represents a reduced immediate threat to the U.S.
However, as President Bush stated above, we must remember the
circumstances which brought about the change in the Soviet
Union, as well as the remarkable events in Eastern Europe.
America should not be too eager to relinquish the position of
28Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, FY91 Defense
Authorization Bill. Committee Markup, Summary of Major
Actions, Washington D.C.: House Armed Services Committee, 31
July 1990, 1.
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strength which has brought about so much positive change, and
influenced so much stability around the world.
.. The Soviet Threat
There is no question today that Gorbachev is seriously
cutting back on Soviet defense. A year or two ago the experts
might have debated the validity of that point, but today the
evidence is too clear, and the Soviet economy too weak to
support a sizeable military. The CIA estimates the Soviet
Union's own budget deficit exceeds 7 percent of its GNP (see
FiQure 4) and continues to grow. The U.S.' response to date
has been cautious. However, due to the reasons discussed
above, and in light of the changes sweeping Eastern Europe,
the U.S. is pressured to also display pragmatic support for
the end of the "Cold War." It is also in the best interest
of the U.S. to support President Gorbachev's "perestroika,"
which is all the more reason to respond to the Soviet's
reductions with cuts in U.S. forces. The question now
becomes, how far will the Soviets cut-back militarily?
There are two terms developed by Gorbachev that
describe his "new thinking" toward Soviet defense: (1)
"Reasonable sufficiency," which is the guidance the Soviets
will use to determine what resources are necessary to maintain
an adequate defense; and (2) "defensive doctrine," which
alludes to the future Soviet strategical orientation of
defending the homeland. Otherwise stated, "Reasonable
38
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sufficiency" is the political leadership in Moscow informing
the military cf the limited amount of resources available for
defense (a radical departure from past doctrine). "Defensive
doctrine" is the military's guidance as to how to carry out
its assigned tasks. Both concepts reflect an acceptance by
the Soviet Union, of the futility of maintaining an
unnecessarily large military force. This is obviously good
news for the West. However, there is still uncertainty among
analysts of the sincerity of these new concepts.
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Skepticism in the West can not be contributed to a
lack of outspoken support from the Soviet leader. In a speech
to the U.N. in December 1988, Gorbachev announced that the
Soviet Union needed to move "from an economy of armament to
an economy of disarmament." He also announced:
• unilateral reductions of 500,000 troops by 1991;
* a reduction of Soviet inventory west of the Urals by
10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery, and 800 aircraft;
" Warsaw Pact strength would be reduced by 110,000 troops-
-about 50,000 of them Soviets, including six tank
divisions;
" and that the remaining East bloc forces are to be
restructured to become unambiguously defensive.29
In January 1989, President Gorbachev also announced the Soviet
Union would reduce weapons procurement by 19.5 percent and
defense spending by 14.2 percent.30 So what does this radical
departure from traditional Soviet behavior mean, especially
to the West?
As Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks pointed out:
In 1988, the Soviets scrapped or otherwise took out of
active service more ships than any year in recent history.
In 1988, Moscow also began selling major combatants for
scrap on the world market. ...
29Michael MccGwire, "About Face: How the Soviets Stopped
Planning for World War," Technology Review 92
(November/December 1989): 40.
30Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, United
States Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the
Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, 22
February 1989, 7.
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But counting numbers of ships in the order of battle
is a fundamentally flawed methodology for measuring naval
capability. The question which must be asked is not "how
many ships have they" but rather "how capable is their
Navy to achieve its mission.
31
The Soviet Union has indeed begun to carry through with its
intention to reduce its military force. However, it is
important to note the type of equipment being cut.
The Soviets are decommissioning their oldest classes
of ships such as the Riga's, Kotlin's, Kanin's, and Kashin's;
and their older submarines such as the Whiskey's, Romeo's,
Foxtrot's, and November's. The numbers of ships and subs
being removed from the fleet sounds impressive, but the types
of equipment were not very capable by today's standards.
Their production of new classes of warships has not
drastically decreased. The Soviets continue to produce Kiev
class aircraft carriers; Sovremennyy and Udaloy clas-
destroyers; and Akula, Victor III, and Oscar II class
submarines. The result is a much smaller naval force in terms
of numbers, however, a much more capable fleet in terms of
advanced technology, weapons and tonnage. The same holds true
for their ground forces in Europe. The reports of Soviet
troops and equipment leaving Eastern Europe returning home is
true. However, the forces that remain in the area, though
much smaller, contain only the most advanced technological
equipment and weapons. Where there was once a large standing
31Ibid., 8-9.
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Soviet force, consisting of a large number of troops which
included older, less advanced equipment, there now exists a
much smaller presence with a greater capability in terms of
technology. 
32
As Figure 533 illustrates, the Soviet Union continues
to allocate more resources to defense spending than any other
industrialized country. However, it is believed the Soviet
32Admiral Trost, Chief of Naval Operations, in a speech
before the Naval Postgraduate School, 8 May 1990.
33Office of Management and Budget.
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economy is not capable to support the continuation of such
spending. Are these cut-backs part of a concerted effort by
rle!ident Gorbachev to decrease the military structure of the
Soviet Union? Do they represent a departure from traditional
Soviet ideology, and represent a shift in the ideological
mindset of the Soviet leadership? Or, are they part of a
grand plan to rebuild the Soviet Union's economic strength,
then rebuild their military with a much stronger and much more
advanced capability? These are the unanswered questions
confronting the analysts today, and the major Soviet concerns
for the '90's.
2. The Need for a New Threat to U.S. Interests
With the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, and the
apparent disappearance of the Soviet threat to western Europe,
there is a real need for the public's recognition of other
potential threats to U.S. national security. In the past,
other less predominant, but nonetheless equally threatening
adversaries, have been overshadowed by the Cold War standoff.
The absence of a secondary peril to serve as a replacement for
the vacant Soviet menace has contributed to the political
pressure to reduce defense spending. The fallacy of this
concept lies in the apparent need for some immediate entity
to be present which threatens the livelihood or interests of
the American people before it becomes necessary to maintain
an adequate defense force.
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For too many years, an adequate level of defense
spending has dangerously lagged behind the necessity for a
strong defense posture. The U.S. has always found itself in
a position of playing catch-up when it comes to actually
needing a strong defense force. At the end of both World War
I and II, the U.S., bowing to the political pressure to
realize a "peace dividend," thought it safe to demobilize its
forces in light of a much safer world environment, only to
find it necessary to rebuild its forces a few years later.
After the Vietnam War, similar pressure forced the
policy-makers to neglect the U.S. I defense posture once again,
only to find itself in a strategically vulnerable position in
the early '80's which necessitated the largest peacetime
military buildup in this nation's history. Why must the U.S.
always find itself in a position to re-arm? Some form of
"peace dividend," be it monetary or psychological, may have
been realized in past periods of reduced defense spending,
however, certainly the savings have only been temporary, and
nullified by the increased spending in subsequent years.
3. Is There Too Much Concern Over Reducing the Deficit?
If the policy-makers had overlooked the lessons of
past periods of increased pressure to reduce defense spending,
Iraq's recent aggression against Kuwait should have served as
a reminder that the world may not be as safe a place as it
sometimes seems. All too often, easy numbers are quickly
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translated into a justification for action. As a result,
variables that are difficult to quantify are quickly
overlooked in terms of their importance or value in the
overall process.
Reagan's defense build-up in the early '80's was often
questioned in terms of its real benefit to U.S. national
security, as opposed to its impact on the economic condition
of the country. The real cost-benefit analysis of the Reagan
military build-up would, undoubtedly, depend on the value
assigned to the specific vari.ables measured, and therefore,
would greatly depend on the priority assignmen: of the
variables by the individual analyst. A hundred different
analysts may arrive at a hundred different answers depending
on their particular value judgement.
If one credits the deterioration of communism
throughout eastern Europe, and the resultant break-up of the
Warsaw Pact, partially or in full to the strong defense
posture of NATO and the U.S., how does one quantify the
changing environment in order to measure the benefit received
from the increase in defense spending? If someone had
guaranteed to the American people 10 years ago that a build-
up of the U.S. defense posture, which would include a dramatic
increase in defense spending and a further increase in the
federal deficit, would result in the current democratic
transformation throughout Eastern Europe and within the oviet
Union, would there not have been sweeping bi-partisan support
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to make the sacrifices necessary to bring about the
deterioration of communism?
When one speaks today of the high fiscal deficit
confronting the U.S., there appears to be an alarming trend
among the American people to point to past defense spending
and the current defense budget as the cause. The politicians
recognize this tendency and turn to the defense budget as an
easy target for reductions in governmental spending. It must
sometimes be remembered that the most valuable commodities in
life don't come cheap. Sacrifices must sometimes be made for
the overall good of the desired result. There are those who
might consider the strengthening of the U.S. national defense
posture, and the corresponding increase in the fiscal deficit,
a small price to pay for the magnitude of change realized in
Europe, and the end to the "Cold War."
B. THE NEED FOR A VIABLE LONG-RANGE DEFENSE STRATEGY
If the United States is determined to make major cuts in
defense, then the opportunity should be used to effectively
structure the remaining force in a more efficient method to
ensure further defense savings over the long-term. This
proposes that the decision-makers in the executive and
legislative branches of government adopt a longer perspective
view of defense, a radical departure from their current system
of planning and programming.
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Although the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) instituted under McNamara was designed to instill such
reforms, those reforms have not developed in the manner they
were originally intended. PPBS was intended to influence the
rational development of a defense budget, based on the
assessment of the U.S.' national threats and its future
defense strategy.
Simplified, the process was designed to plan for the
future by determining clear objectives, and the necessary
national defense strategy to meet those objectives 2 to 7
years into the future. Next, the system called for the
development and/or identification of specific defense programs
to meet the planning objectives. The budgeting phase simply
called for the allocation of the necessary resources to fund
the identified programs.
The process faltered due to the lack of support throughout
government. Despite DoD's efforts to focus on the long-range
defense strategy and fund programs for the future, Congress
continued to focus on the short-term. The same problem exist
today. Instead of "strategy determining the budget," it is
more often, "budget determining the strategy."
This is not to say that the system does not work at all,
only that it tends to adapt itself to the constraints of
Congress. The emphasis today remains, as it has since PPBS
was instituted, on the immediate year's programs and budget,
vice a long-range perspective plan. Gansler stated:
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Although the reforms that have given us the current
system were designed to instill orderliness and encourage
rationality in the budget process, in many respects these
improvements have not yet come to pass.
3 4
The U.S. strategists and policy makers must revert back
to the basics. They must first determine the potential
conflict the U.S. might find itself facing in the future, and
then plan accordingly to select the proper weapon systems and
force structure needed to fight that conflict. This is what
PPBS was designed to do from the beginning. As any politician
will admit, this is a task much easier said than done. As the
Honorable Russell Murray, former Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation during the Carter
Administration, stated in a recent interview:
I thought for a long time that the biggest problem, and
probably the most elemental problem of all, is we don't
have a rational way of determining our national security
policy. We just completely miss the idea of matching ends
with means, deciding what it is that [the U.S.] would like
to do . . .35
34Gansler, 102. Gansler cites 4 specific examples: (1) if
Congress makes changes in the budget on which it is conducting
hearings, there is a direct effect not only on the DoD's plans
for that year but also on the two other "out-year" budgets
that the DoD is concurrently planning; (2) in the executive
branch, the tendency is to focus ail attention on the budget
for the next year due to pressures from the Congress and DoD
to economize; (3) the executive branch tends to budget for
inflation using overly optimistic estimates for the coming
year; and (4) there is a major difference between the amount
Congress authorizes the DoD to spend in any one year and how
much the DoD actually lays out in payments during that year.
35Russell Murray, Hon., former Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation during the Carter
Administration, interviewed by author, 22 October 1990,
Alexandria, Virginia, tape recorded.
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The determination and declaration of a national security
policy by the chief executive is, unquestionably, the first
essential step in the PPBS procedure. Whether or not the
present administration, or past administrations, has
successfully produced a clear and concise policy statement is
up for debate. Mr. Murray clearly felt the present
administration had failed to do so, therefore, the present
disagreements between Congress and the president over future
defense spending is due, in part, to the absence of such
guidance.
There are many others who believe the present
administration has clearlv stated its policy objectives
regarding national defense. As Dr. James G. Roche stated:
The reason Russ Murray can say with a straight face that
the administration doesn't have a national security
policy, is that the administration has not articulated
national security policy with which Russ Murray agrees.
I know Russ very well. Factually, there are documents
that come out at the beginning of each year, its called
National Security Policy, just as the Congress asks for.
It is reflected in the stat ents from the State
Department. It is reflected in ;he chairman's brief to
the Congress. It is reflected in the Secretary's posture
statement. It exists. It ain't bad as a global [policy],
but it isn't what Russ [Murray] wants.36
36James G. Roche, Ph.D., Vice President and Special
Assistant to the President and CEO of the Northrop
Corporation, interviewed by author, 26 October 1990, Los
Angeles, California, tape recorded. Prior to joining
Northrop, Dr. Roche was the Democratic Staff Director, Senate
Armed Services Committee, where he worked for Senators Scoop
Jackson and Sam Nunn. Dr. Roche had earlier served as the
Principal Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy
Planning Staff during 1981 and 1982, served as a senior
professional staff member of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (1979-80), and was Assistant Director of the
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As Dr. Roche stated, the White House publishes a document at
the beginning of each calendar year entitled National Security
Stratefy of the United States, which specifically outlines the
administration's national security policy. In addition, the
present administration has re-enforced its security policy in
public statements, such as the president's speech to the Aspen
Institute Symposium on 2 August 1990, and the Secretary of
Defense's speech to the International Institute for Strategic
Studies on 6 September 1990. The problem is that there are
535 other "Secretary of Defenses" in Congress who have their
own personal idea of what the U.S.' national security policy
should be. Therefore, the president's policy statement is
virtually ignored, particularly by the membership of the
opposite political party.
Assuming the president has articulated a concise national
security policy, the PPBS process has the foundation required
to successfully begin and fulfill its requirements. One of
the major setbacks of the system is not the system itself, but
the failure of Congress to work under the same guidelines of
PPBS.
PPBS assumes that after the national security policies are
clearly stated and objectives are outlined, the means (i.e.
weapons required, force levels needed, etc.) to meet those
objectives are programmed into the process and long-range
office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (1975-79).
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spending is allocated to fund them. Until Congress adopts a
longer view of defense spending, the original objectives of
PPBS will not be realized.
DoD continues to operate under the assumption that PPBS
is alive and well. Figure 6 illustrates the process by which
DoD operates today. However, for the most part, their efforts
are in vain as long as Congress only funds for the short-
term, and continually changes procurement quantities from year
to year on existing programs. There must be more stability
in the defense budget and procurement system before real
defense objectives will be met, and real dollar savings will
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be realized over the long-term as PPBS was designed to
produce. The need for stability within the Pentagon's budget
is also important for rebuilding the industrial base.
C. THE NEGLECTED INDUSTRIAL BASE
One of the most serious military concerns facing the U.S.
in the '90's, especially in light of future cutbacks in
defense spending, is the strength of the industrial base. As
stated by The White House:
The defense industrial base must be strong, and
include manufacturers that are highly flexible and
technologically advanced.
37
The problem has been that the U.S. government, both the
executive and legislative branches, have relied on the large
defense contractors and market conditions to maintain an
adequate number of subcontractors and part suppliers. This
strategy has not worked.
The decision-makers have been content to make statements,
much like the one above, without much more involverment or
interest in the problem. As a result, the present health of
the U.S. industrial base is poor in terms of its capacity to
surge if necessary to respond to crises that may develop.
There are probably three primary reasons why this situation
developed:
37The White House, 32.
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" instability in the defense market place;
" the excessive amount of government regulations throughout
the defense industry; and
• a reduced demand, and therefore, a reduction in the
required suppliers due to the absence of any conflict over
the years.
In addition to the above factors, there has been a willingness
to ignore the problem in hopes that it would either cure
itself, or not be necessary to rely on the industrial base
because of the maintenance of peace around the world.
Although the industrial base is in poor condition, the
majority of the large defense contractors themselves are not
in jeopardy of collapse. The defense industry has been down
this road once before during the post-Vietnam era, and during
a much tougher economic environment. At that time, many of
the largest defense contractors were forced to look for new
areas to diversify, or face virtual extinction due to a lack
of business.
At the height of the Vietnam War, military spending peaked
at $323.7 billion (in 1990 dollars), then continually declined
to a low of $203.3 billion by 1976 (see Figure 7). Companies
such as General Motors, Boeing, United Technologies and
General Electric have since become much more dependent on
their civilian businesses, and less concerned with defense
contracts (see Figure 8). Boeing's commercial backlog alone
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has grown from $18.6 billion in 1985 to $73.9 billion at the
end of 1989.38
Other companies, such as General Dynamics, McDonnell
Douglas, Grumman and Lockheed, have continued to rely heavily
on the government for business, and as a result, have good
reason to be concerned of future budget cuts. The Defense
Budget Project, a Washington think tank, predicts that defense
spending will fall by 13.6 percent, to $261 billion, by 1995,
38
"The Pentagon's menagerie," The Economist, 16 June 1990,
69.
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and to perhaps $225 billion by the year 2000. As outlined in
an article for Business Week magazine, cutbacks in defense
spending of this magnitude will have detrimental effects on
the labor force around the country.
Economic forecaster DRI/McGraw Hill predicts that perhaps
1 million defense-related jobs could vanish between 1989-
1995, including 830,000 in the private sector, or 20% of
all jobs in defense-related industries. And the people
who lose them, workers with specialized skills in building
ships or guided missiles, will find few comparable jobs
in commercial industries.39
The real problem of the industrial base lies in the lower
tiers below the large defense contractors: the subcontractors
and parts suppliers. This is where the effects mentioned
above will be felt the hardest, and do the most damage to the
industry as a whole. Other variables such as the reduction
in demand for parts, the excessive requirements and
regulations on the manufacturing of components, and an over
dependence on the government for business, threaten to further
eliminate, or severely damage, more companies in the lower
tiers.
Even companies who feel fairly secure with their future
position are preparing for the rocky road ahead by cutting
back where ever possible to reduce future costs. William J.
Hunter, Manager of Tiburon Systems, Inc., Washington D.C.
Operations (a leading supplier of software to various weapon
systems), stated that their company has been "forced to let
39James E. Ellis, Eric Schine, et al., "Who Pays for
Peace?" Business Week, 2 July 1990, 64-65.
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go 20 or 25 people this year." The numbers seem small at
first, however, the company only employs approximately 200.
He pointed out that the reduction in defense spending has
forced his company to "become more efficient" throughout their
operations. 40
Other companies, some of which would not be considered
small businesses, are in jeopardy of losing much more as
40William J. Hunter, Manager, Tiburon Systems, Inc.,
Washington D.C. Operations, interviewed by author, 22 October
1990, Crystal City, Virginia.
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spending cuts are mada. Northrop's B-2 program, having just
weathered another storm at the end of FY-90, is undoubtedly
in for more difficult times as more concern is raised over the
high costs and necessity for future U.S. defense needs. As
Ficqure 9 illustrates, Northrop relies heavily on the B-2
program as a percentage of its total revenues from major
programs. As Richard W. Stevenson reported:
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Northrop can survive without the B-2, albeit as a
smaller company. But it probably will never thrive again
41
Northrop is probably not in any immediate danger of
collapse. However, drastic cutbacks in defense spending,
especially the outright elimination of major programs such as
the B-2, would undoubtedly have a detrimental effect on the
industrial base as a whole, both in terms of the loss in its
capacity to surge if needed, and through the signal which is
sent to other firms who may be considering government
contracts in the future. If firms such as Northrop can be
damaged by budget cuts, more companies will be less likely put
up with the governmental bureaucracy required in the defense
industry, and more defense firms will, if able, look toward
the commercial sector for future business. This will result
in a further reduction of the critical suppliers necessary in
a crisis situation.
Gansler pointed out an example that clearly shows the
problem is not a new one. In 1974 Congress authorized a
doubling of tank production. Despite the fact the Army had
insisted, if necessary, it would be able to double production,
initially the Army could not produce the tanks in increased
numbers. Gansler wrote:
Surge capability, through excess capacity (including extra
capital equipment) was built in at the prime-contractor
level, but at the lower level there was neither sufficient
41Richard W. Stevenson, "Scandals, cutbacks may ground
Northrop," San Jose Mercury News, 31 October 1990, 1C.
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capacity nor competition. Thus, both the benefits of
peacetime competitive efficiencies and the benefits of
wartime surge capability were totally lost. Perhaps most
surprising, the DoD had failed to notice the problem.42
The lack of a surge capability is not the only problem
that needs to be addressed. There is one other very important
point to consider with regard to the shrinking number of
critical subcontractors and part suppliers. The decreasing
availability of critical parts and systems in the U.S. will
force a reliance on suppliers outside the U.S. A growing
dependence on foreign suppliers for critical components within
weapon systems is not healthy to U.S. national security.
Gansler wrote:
The U.S. defense industry is now heavily, if not
totally, dependent on foreign sources for computer memory
chips, silicon for high-powered electronic switching,
gallium arsenide-based semiconductors for high-speed data
processing, precision glass for reconnaissance satellites
and other military equipment, liquid crystal and luminous
displays, and advanced fiber optics.43
Daniel Burstein wrote of the problem:
Japanese Consumer technology is so studded with military
applications that a majority of all new American military
hardware systems use at least some components made in
Japan. Carbon-fiber composites originally developed in
Japan for tennis rackets are now used in U.S. jet fighter
frames. Electro-optics breakthroughs in Toshiba's home
42Gansler, 259-260. Gansler cited a number of other
examples where the U.S. has been unable to meet increased
demands for weapon systems, and discussed other problems
confronting the condition of the industrial base.
43Ibid., 271.
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video equipment are used in the Pentagon's most advanced
missile guidance systems.
44
A report released 31 July 1990 by the Defense Science
Board, conducted for the U.S. Department of Defense, also
warned of the growing threat of foreign dependence. The
report stated:
[Because foreign firms now dominate] the leading edge of
many critical technologies . . . successive generations
of weapons are increasingly dependent on foreign parts45
In response to the report, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
warned:
The United States cannot persist in its current
laissez-faire approach to the competition in advanced
technologies without incurring major economic and security
problems of its own in the future.
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The U.S.' interdependence on critical parts for weapon
systems is alarming to consider in view of its perceived
strength in advanced weapons and technology. The U.S. can
only hope, if the need does present itself, that its adversary
is not a leading supplier of a critical component. The
problems with the industrial base will have to be addressed
at some point. The politicians must decide whether to tackle
44Daniel Burstein, YEN! Japan's New Financial Empire and
Its Threat to America (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988;
postscript 1990), 286.
45Robert A. Rankin, "Foreign takeovers called a threat,"
San Jose Mercury News, 1 August 1990, 1F.
46Ibid.
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it now, or put it off as they have until a real crisis forces
a quick solution to the issue.
Of all the problems being addressed in this paper, the
current dilemma over the industrial base is probably the most
difficult to solve. The United States was founded and grew
to "superpower" status on the principles of free enterprise
and competition. The introduction of governmental
regulations, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant,
to solve the various problems which arise from time to time
throughout this country's infrastructure, only diverts this
nation's path from the direction our founding fathers intended
upon conception.
There are those who would argue that the problem of the
industrial base belongs to the DoD. There are others who
blame the lack of governmental intervention. No matter who
is to blame, or what, if any, solution is instituted to try
and correct the deficiencies, there will remain those who
disagree with the steps taken, and those that will argue that
the government isn't doing enough.
D. THE THREAT TO THE U.S.' TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY
Throughout the years, the United States has remained
strong militarily through possession of the most
technologically advanced military in the world. It was not,
necessarily, through possession of the largest military force.
Of course, the U.S. military structure has grown substantially
61
in the past decade, and its large size is a factor that must
be considered by potential adversaries. However, since the
end of World War II, it has primarily been the superior
technology of the U.S. arsenal that has deterred the Soviet
Union from any aggressive behavior in Europe, or toward
America. The Soviet Union undoubtedly possessed the larger
military force of the two superpowers, so there had to be
something other than shear numbers deterring them from attack.
1. The Importance of Continued Research and Development
It is the natural tendency of most human beings to
strive to better their welfare and environment. This
progressive behavior has been the catalyst for scientific
research, and responsible for the world's high standard of
living today. Without investments in R&D, the airlines would
still be flying two engine, reciprocating propeller aircraft
(if they existed at all), the earth would be a much more
polluted place, and the moon would be unexplored. The U.S.
must be careful not to obstruct the progress of R&D, because
of the demand to realize short-term savings.
In FY-60, President Eisenhower's last budget, 80.3
percent of federal R&D expenditures went for defense projects.
By FY-79, midway through the Carter administration, the
portion of federal R&D obligations going for defense had
declined to 48 percent. In President Reagan's 1983 State of
the Union Address, he stated:
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This administration is committed to keeping America the
technoloay leader of the world now and into the 21st
century.
By FY-87, the poction of recteral R&D expenditures
spent on defense had climbed to a high of 73 percent. In FY-
88, DoD spending for all categories of R&D comprised about 62
percent of all federal R&D spending. DoD spent $38 billion
while the entire federal government spent about $61 billion.
The total expenditures on R&D in the U.S., including private
sources, totaled about $130 billion.48
Statements made by President Bush indicate his
recognition of the importance of continued R&D funding. In
remarks made by the president at the Aspen Institute Symposium
on 2 August 1990, he stated:
Time and again, we have seen technology revolutionize the
battlefield. The U.S. has always relied upon its
technological edge to offset the need to match potential
adversaries' strength in numbers.
And we must realize the heavy price that we will pay
if we look for false economies in research and development
for defense. . . . The nature of national defense demands
that we plan now for threats on the distant horizon.
49
The federal government funds nearly half of the total
investment in R&D each year. This investment is not for the
47James Savage, "Federal R&D Budget Policy in the Reagan
Administration," Public Budgeting & Finance (Summer 1987): 37.
48Breck W. Henderson, "U.S. Defense Budget Cuts Could
Imperil Nation's Research and Development Effort," Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 18 December 1989, 38.
49The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks
by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium, 2 August
1990.
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sole purpose of research into more destructive weapon systems.
It is also going to pay the salary and expenses of scientists
researching a number of projects, some of which may have
implications for civilian use, as well as the military.
Boeing's High Technology Center, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories, and NASA Ames Research Center are just a few
places where this work is carried out.
The greatest threat to U.S. national security is
losing the technological lead. Weapons projects should not
be continued only to save the corresponding R&D growth,
however, before Congress places programs on the chopping
block, they should be required to resolve how to save and
continue the technological progress.
For example, if it is decided by Congress that the B-2
does not have a mission in today's force structure, that does
not necessarily mean it won't be needed in future years. To
abandon all of the progress achieved to date would be a gross
waste of the taxpayer's money, no matter what the savings
would be in the short-term. Progress must be preserved and
continued. Breck W. Henderson wrote:
R&D is viewed as a "luxury" that can be painlessly
done away with. Generals cannot fly in it or shoot it and
Congress sees few voters employed by it, so it is the
first item to be cut when spending must be reduced.
Before some of this nation's best scientists and
engineers who are working in defense-supported research
and development projects are thrown out of work by hurried
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spending cuts, I believe we must think carefully about
what that may do to our technology base.
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If reductions are to be made in federal or defense R&D
expenditures, then careful consideration should be made to
redistributing the funds into civilian research institutions
and projects. To assume that the money saved from a reduction
in defense R&D spending would be redirected into civilian R&D
projects, is the wrong assumption. As Dr. Roche stated:
* . but the people who want to link the defense
investment, are assuming that if they didn't put money
into defense R&D they will be putting money into civilian
R&D. And my argument is, oh really? And how would they
make those choices?51
Some would argue that the United States has been
paying the bill for the major portion of R&D, while most of
the industrialized world has gotten a free ride from the U.S.'
generosity and blundering. To some degree this may be true,
however, the U.S. can not simply stop all its efforts in hopes
that some other country will continue the progress and share
their future discoveries. Such a strategy would place the
U.S. in a much more vulnerable position.
At the same time, it should not be necessary for the
U.S. to sink large sums of money into prototype development
to test each new discovery. The funding of basic research
should remain the number one priority and concern of U.S.
efforts. Prototype testing and full-scale development should
50Ibid., 39.
51Interview with Dr. Roche.
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only be funded after a detailed analysis into the real need
for the technology and its application in the future U.S.
force structure.
2. The Threat to the U.S.$ Lead in Aerospace Technology
The United States cannot afford to give up its quest
to remain technologically superior, even though the fight to
remain there is getting tougher. Today, more and more
industrialized countries are gaining ground on the U.S.' lead
in all categories of science. In fact, it can be argued that
the U.S. only holds the absolute technological lead in one
major area, "aerospace," and that lead is being threatened.
The U.S. remains the world's aerospace leader.
Aerospace products are America's leading export, however,
since 1985, the U.S.' share of the global market has declined
from 73 to 62 percent, while the European share has increased
from 21 to 31 percent. This market is clearly one example
where, many feel, the U.S. has contributed to its own decline
through the sharing of R&D technology. Japan is probably the
one country who has capitalized the most through U.S.
assistance, although, certainly not the only country
threatening the U.S.' dominance in the industry.
In order to expedite an advancement in the field,
Japan had to rely on the assistance of an established expert
to gain the required aerospace knowledge. Japan chose to look
towara tne u.b. xor this assistance, as would be expected due
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to the close security ties between the two countries. They
managed to acquire the technology through a number of
cooperative ventures between U.S. and Japanese companies, such
as Japan's coproduction with McDonnell Douglas of the F-15,
the present mainstay of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force;
and Boeing's venture with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI),
Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI), and Fuji Heavy Industries
(FHI) on the production of fuselage components for the 767
aircraft, of which the Japanese companies have achieved a
cost/quality advantage.52
U.S. concern over the escaping aerospace technology,
and its possible affect on U.S. national security, was very
discernible during the controversy over the rSX 53 cooperative
venture between Japan, lead by MHI, and General Dynamics. In
the beginning of 1989, U.S. Commerce Secretary Robert A.
Mosbacher questioned the security of the technology transfer
involved with the original FSX agreement between Japan and the
Reagan administration. His concern sparked d series of heated
debates in Congress over the risks involved with the FSX
venture.
America is feeling the growing aerospace competition
in Europe as well. In 1989, Daimler-Benz made great strides
52John R. Harbison, "Japan's Emerging Aerospace Industry,"
USA Today, March 1990, 34.
53The FSX, short for Fighter Support Experimental, will
be the follow-on aircraft for the Japanese Air Self-Defense
Force. It is intended to replace the ageing F-4's and F-15's.
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to acquire a large share of the country's aerospace market.
Already purchasing two leading aerospace firms, Motoren-und-
Turbinen-Union (MTU) and Dornier, Daimler then acquired West
Germany's largest, the Bavaria-based Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm (MBB). The three firms were combined to form Deutsche
Aerospace with annual sales of around DM14 billion ($7.5
billion), roughly the same size as British Aerospace. This
venture alone was enough to frighten the critics in Europe.
As reported in The Economist:
Critics complain that Daimler will have excessive power
in aerospace and military hardware and be too big a
recipient of government contracts and money.
5 4
To further complicate the U.S.' concern, on the 3rd
and 4th of March this year, secret discussions were held
between West Germany's Daimler-Benz and Japan's Mitsubishi in
Singapore. The outcome of the discussions was a plan for
cooperation and technological exchanges in three fields: (1)
aerospace; (2) electronics; and (3) services.
Less than a year after Daimler-Benz develops into a
potential leading competitor in aerospace, they conclude a
cooperative agreement with Mitsubishi. Is this a deliberate
move on the part of Mitsubishi, or just coincidental timing
in relation to the Boeing and FSX deals? One can only guess,
however, just days after the discussions in Singapore, the
chairman of MHI announced his firm would build a 75-seat
54
"Daimler-Benz: On the runway," The Economist, 8 April
1989, 72.
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commuter plane with Deutsche Aerospace. As it turned out this
announcement was a little premature on the part of MHI's
chairman, Yotaro Iida, and sparked a series of denials
throughout Mitsubishi Corporation and Daimler-Benz.55 However,
it indicated the volatile nature of this new cooperation
effort between the two conglomerates.
The intricate reverberations possible with this deal
between Daimler and Mitsubishi are fascinating! Boeing's
leading European competitor is the European consortium of
Airbus Industrie, of which MBB is a partner. Through their
new deal, Mitsubishi not only serves as a subcontractor for
Boeing, but now also is a partner with MBB. Along with their
co-development project with General Dynamics, Japan has
managed to gain a penetrating insight into aerospace
technology around the world.
Deutsche Aerospace, through their cooperative venture
with Mitsubishi, has gained access to Japanese technology,
which, as we have discussed, has important implications to
U.S. national security. The repercussions possible throughout
the world aerospace market because of the Daimler-Mitsubishi
accord are only limited to the imagination. It will be very
interesting to watch future events for their impact on an
already volatile situation. The discussions in Singapore
excluded talks on defense related issues, due primarily to
55Jeff Shear, "German-Japanese Flirtation Sure to Produce
U.S. Jitters," InsiQht, 16 April 1990, 37.
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Japan's self-imposed ban on arms exports. However, there are
differing opinions as to just how long such a ban will last.
3. Other Considerations
As more and more pressure is placed upon the policy-
makers to reduce defense spending, the threat to U.S. national
security through the decline of technological superiority
becomes all the more important. The technological advancement
within the industrialized countries of the world can affect
U.S. national security through indirect means. It became of
foremost concern after Toshiba Corporation exported computer-
guided propeller milling machines to the Soviet Union, which
severely damaged the U.S.' technological advantage in
submarine noise reduction. However, despite this concern, the
U.S. continues to provide Japan with access to technology
critical to its national security.
In 1987 the U.S. and Japan signed an agreement
establishing the conditions for Japan's participation in the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research. With the recent
debate within the U.S. Congress over future funding for SDI,
one wonders what will become of the progress made to date.
Is it conceivable that Japan could continue to pursue the
project, and may some day acquire such a system? Burstein
wrote:
Having brought Japan into the initial stages of Star Wars
research, the United States may at some point abandon the
program as too costly or unworkable. Japan, with its
combination of high-tech proficiencies and financial
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resources, may be quite willing to develop and perfect
such a system.
56
All of the above mentioned issues require the
attention of the U.S. executive and legislative branches of
government. They are all affected, either directly or
indirectly, by the budgetary priorities and decisions. The
U.S.' technological edge, or what remains of it, should not
be sacrificed because of a failure by the policy-makers to
recognize the problem until its too late.
56Burstein, 291.
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III. REFURBISHMENT OF THE SYSTEM
The refurbishment necessary within the governmental
bureaucratic system to lessen the detrimental affects of
budget cutbacks on the U.S. national security posture can not
be focused on one individual branch or department of
government. The necessary changes must incorporate both the
executive and legislative branches, as well as the Department
of Defense. The required refinements are not designed to
improve conditions within that particular area of government
alone. Instead, the changes must work in conjunction with an
awareness and cooperation from the other components of the
process to more effectively transform the system.
Without the recognition and cooperation by all involved,
the process will continue to frustrate both the American
people and the membership working within the system. But more
importantly, without full cooperation within the three
decision-making components which primarily affect U.S.
national security (i.e., DoD and the executive and legislative
branches), any meaningful exertion by only one component will
go unrewarded in terms of the benefits possible with sweeping
enthusiasm by all involved. It will not be easy!
This thesis is not attempting to expel reality through a
miraculous transformation of the process overnight, nor is a
miraculous transformation required. The democratic system of
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government that has been in place within the U.S. for well
over 2JO years may not be the most efficient governmental
process, and it may have a number of weaknesses. However, the
fundamental principles upon which the country was founded
remain sound, and they have successfully proven themselves to
be far superior to any other political bureaucracy which has
challenged those principles in modern times.
The U.S. governmental foundation is not in need of reform.
The following recommended changes are only to those
bureaucratic appendages which have grown over the years into
counter-productive elements within the process. The following
sections will address specific problem areas within each of
the primary components which influence the U.S. national
security posture: the Department of Defense, the president,
and the Congress.
A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN9E
It does not fall within the scope of this paper to address
all the current problems or needed improvements within the
DoD's procurement and acquisition process. A paper of that
scope and magnitude would provide a very challenging task for
a Doctoral Dissertation alone. This thesis addresses the
57See Jacques S. Gansler, The Defense Industry (Cambridge:
The MIT Press, 1980) ; and also Gansler, Affording Defense
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989). On competition see Donald
L. Pilling, Competition in Defense Procurement (Washington
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989).
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needed changes which will impact the efficiency of DoD's
operations, thus, providing a more receptive framework for
effective utilization of allocated resources. Progress in
this area has, and will continue to be slow in its development
simply because of the complex bureaucracy and intricate
economic relationships throughout the defense industrial base.
There have been numerous improvements within DoD in recent
years toward the correction of deficient areas throughout the
department. Unfortunately, not enough of the change has been
due to DoD's initiative and concern for the problems.
Primarily, change has come as a result of investigations from
outside parties. Examples of such outside involvement include
the "Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management" lead by David Packard in 1986, and more currently
the "Ill Wind" investigation looking into fraud throughout the
Pentagon's procurement process.
58
Some would say that investigations from parties not
connected with DoD is the only way meaningful change will
manifest itself and lead to a betterment of the process. DoD
must begin to dispel that supposition, through the enactment
58The "Ill Wind" investigation does not focus so much on
the wrongdoings within DoD, as it does the fraud between
defense executives and industries. So far, the investigation
has lead to the convictions of 39 defense executives and
consultants, former government officials, and corporations.
It focuses on efforts by U.S. defense companies to obtain
classified government documents that helped them win lucrative
contracts. "Probe of defense-buying fraud picks up force for
new phase," San Jose Mercury News, 23 November 1990, 12A.
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of more critical self-examinations of its own operational
procedures.
The reason is simple. Much of the change within DoD has
been brought about because of the growing concern among the
American public over the effective use of limited resources
throughout the government. A primary catalyst for the
increased attention and criticism over DoD's internal
operations is due to unfavorable disclosures concerning fraud,
waste, and abuse throughout the system. Simply stated, both
the Congress and the American people have lost confidence in
DoD's ability to efficiently conduct business.
Therefore, the first step in the process is, without
question, for DoD to regain the confidence of the Congress and
the American people. As Russell Murray stated:
If there is a lack of trust between Congress and the
Pentagon, that idea of long-range commitments will never
come up. If the military services really want to have
longer term commitments, and I think there are a lot of
good arguments to have them, they just have to be much
more open about how they (manage programs].59
1. Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
The Packard Commission conducted a survey in 1986 and
noted that Americans believe, on average, that half the
defense budget is squandered away on waste and abuse.60 How
can one really blame the public when stories surface about
591nterview with Mr. Murray.
60Gansler, Affording Defense, 195.
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$640 toilet seats for military aircraft, and $435 hammers?61
Disclosures such as these were the impetus for a flurry of
investigations into the military's procurement process
beginning in the '70's. This growing anxiety among the
American people over the credibility of military spending,
only heightens concern when one hears of revised estimates of
the increased costs associated with military procurement
(e.g., projections in August of $840 million per B-2 aircraft
due to plans to cut production in half). 62
The most important step in the process of restoring
America's confidence is to take the initiative to uncover its
own internal problems. So long as the Congress and the
American people believe that only the investigations conducted
by impartial parties will deliver results, confidence will
continue to suffer. Examinations initiated by the executive
branch do not count as internally conceived. The source of
the internal examinations must be no higher than the members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
These internal examinations, or inspections, must
critically appraise the intricate activities ongoing in all
phases of their budgetary process. The task will be large and
time consuming! However, the long-term effects of regaining
61Eric Schmitt, "No $435 Hammers, But Questions," The New
York Times, 23 October 1990, 16.
62Eric Schmitt, "House Panel Votes to Cut Off Bomber," The
New York Times, 1 August 1990, A10.
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public respect will more than offset the short-term costs
required to do the job.
When internal problems are discovered, they must be
publicly acknowledged. If the problem is due to some iniquity
or negligence within DoD, then the rectifications must be
expedient and comprehensive. If the problem is due to the
indecorous behavior by some defense contractor, the issue must
be brought to the attention of the government.
Positive measures are already being taken in this
direction, however, more of the same need to continue. One
example is the Air Forces' investigation into its own dealings
with the Northrop Corporation, which was lead by Brigadier
General Robert Drewes. Drewes said he found "some problems"
in every program he investigated, some of which included the
B-2 stealth bomber, the Tacit-Rainbow anti-radiation loitering
missile, and the ALQ-135 jammer.63
It should also be pointed out that this investigation
did not place all the blame on Northrop. There was some
question as to the Air Forces' role. Drewes apparently
avoided questions which involved the Air Force acquisition
chief John Welch, but did comment, "I was impressed by the
scope of the problems."6'
63Jessica Eve Budro, "Air Force Investigators Say Every
Northrop Program is Substandard," Inside the Pentagon 6, no.
41, 11 October 1990, 11.
64Ibid.
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Wrongful practices by defense contractors must be
punished! The punishment must be sufficient to deter future
temptation by the same company and others to repeat the crime.
Critics maintain that the results of investigations such as
"Ill Wind" are only transitory, due to the excessively light
punishment (i.e., in many cases only hefty fines or jail terms
for involved personnel). They insist that fraudulent business
practices must be punished by barring defense contractors from
future business with the Pentagon.
The Pentagon's argument is that such punishment would
jeopardize national security through further deterioration of
the industrial base. If companies such as Grumman and
Lockheed, with 79 and 74 percent (respectfully) of their total
sales going to the Pentagon,65 were barred from future defense
business, one could see how this argument would be true.
Nonetheless, punishment must be administered, and it must be
sufficient to deter further offenses.
In order to rinimize the detrimental effects on the
industrial base, the Pentagon should adopt a program of
punishment which would prohibit companies from bidding on
future defense contracts for a specified period of time (of
course, in addition to continued stiff penalties of fines and
imprisonment when necessary). This program would not severely
damage their present industrial structure or the contracts
65
"The Pentagon's menagerie," The Economist, 16 June 1990,
70.
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already established. However, it would provide the necessary
deterrence within the defense industry to prevent companies
from the considering wrongful practices.
The services must not be afraid of disturbing the
status quo of present day operations. If the job is done
properly shake-ups will, undoubtedly, occur throughout the
system. What must not happen is a half-hearted attempt to
appease the American public and Congress with a superficial
internal examination which does nothing more than increase
paperwork. The services must not under estimate the public's
intelligence. If a weapon system is not meeting design
specifications, or if a defense contract was fraudulently
acquired, then DoD must be the one to "blow the whistle," not
the network news, or shows like "60 Minutes."
2. Declarative Policy and Defense Capabilities
The present day military structure has been thoroughly
bombarded with criticism that it has been too structured
toward fighting the East-West war in Europe (and critically
questioned if it could successfully accomplish that mission),
especially, since most administrations truly felt such a war
would never materialize. The bombardment intensified with the
recent mobilization of forces to Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf region. The criticism was not without justification, nor
did it fall on deaf ears. In order to win the respect of the
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American public, the Pentagon must begin a campaign to "put
its money where its mouth is."
It is one thing to declare certain capabilities in
order to deceive an enemy into believing the corollary
circumstances of aggression would be unacceptable in terms of
the damage and personnel losses sustained. It is another to
deceive one's own country into believing its national security
posture is much more capable than it really is, permitting a
false sense of security to permeate within government. The
Pentagon has not deceived its government, however, there
appears to be some question, both within government and the
American people, as to the military's true capabilities,
primarily due to disturbing reports from the media of military
equipment and systems not capable of performing as advertised.
If weapon systems do not work as advertised, whether
it is because of a deficiency in the military or the defense
industry, that issue must brought to the attention of
government. Publicizing such information as early as possible
accomplishes three important goals:
it will clearly outline the true capabilities of military
hardware, thus, leaving no doubt as to the status of the
U.S. national security posture;6
66Of ourse, national security should not be jeopardized
just to ensure the flaws within the military are made public.
There is a fine line which must be observed in accomplishing
this goal.
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" it will assist in the restoration of public confidence in
the Pentagon's ability manage its own internal affairs;
and
" it will shift some of the responsibility for correcting
the problems to the executive and legislative branches,
for ultimately they are responsible for providing
resources and needed attention to deficient areas.
Defense Secretary Cheney has committed himself to
improving the defense acquisition process, by streamlining
operations and insuring weapon systems work properly. His
commitment only intensified after personal embarrassments,
such as the time he testified the Navy's A-12 program was on
track, and only a few weeks later General Dynamics and
McDonnell Douglas announced the program was at least a year
behind schedule. 67
When dealing with the congressional process, DoD
appears to be fighting an uphill battle. Even if Secretary
Cheney successfully managed to streamline the procurement
process, there is no guarantee the money will be used to
offset the growing fiscal debt. As long as Congress continues
to redirect federal funds toward such items as a $5 million
building for the Solomon Islands' 38-member Parliament and the
$100,000 study on how to protect people in New Mexico from
falling space capsules, 6 the illusive "peace dividend" will
continue to circumvent public recognition.
67Schmitt, "No $435 Hammers, But Questions."
6Mark Thompson, "Congress cuts Pentagon, then adds its
own projects," The Baltimore Sun, 23 October 1990, 1.
81
3. Congress in the PPBB Process
DoD should include Congress in the PPBS process. As
mentioned earlier, DoD continues to operate under the
principles of PPBS. However, their efforts are nullified as
long as Congress continues to fund for the short-term, and
changes the yearly procurement quantities of the various
defense programs. As was illustrated earlier in Figure 6 (see
page 51), Congress does not appear on the PPBS diagram until
the president submits his final budget proposal for the new
fiscal year. The president's budget proposal should not be
the first time Congress is introduced to DoD's planning and
programming objectives, especially when they are resronsible
for the ultimate budget.
Figure 6 should be redrawn to include Congress in both
the planning and programming phase. The congressional
micromanagement of the defense budget is currently much too
time intensive (as will be discussed below), and further
involvement by Congress during these phases would have to be
restricted to an advisory position. However, this would
provide Congress with an input to DoD's planning and
programming strategy, and may inject more realism and
stability into the process.
B. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Although DoD must take the initiative to regain the
public's confidence, the ultimate responsibility for the
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actions within the department falls within the executive
branch. They must provide the necessary oversight and
direction to ensure the proper measures are taken, however,
they must be careful not to extend unnecessary micro-
management. To do so would undermine the attempts by DoD to
regain the trust of Congress.
It is important to briefly note the political relationship
between the president and Congress, because of the
corresponding constraints due to the democratic party's
majority in Congress. One can easily recognize the problems
encountered by a Republican administration interacting with
a Democratic Congress, or vice versa. One can also discern
the advantages of an administration with a party majority in
Congress. This relationship is significant in analy'ing the
process by which budgetary decisions are made within
government.
This factor will be discussed in more detail in the
following section. For now, let us suffice to say that the
present political relationship between the executive and
legislative branches of government is much too antagonistic.
As was mentioned earlier, the strength of the U.S.' democratic
system has been clearly demonstrated during times when it
collectively joined together, no matter what political
relationships or majorities existed. Both the current
administration and Congress needs to recognize that now,
because of the fiscal condition of the U.S.' economy and the
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deployment of troops in the Persian Gulf region, it is crucial
that the decision-makers within government abandon the
childish rhetoric of political "soap boxes," in favor of a
united stand for the good of the nation.
The president has his own problem areas which require
attention, other than those specific to DoD. Both areas
addressed below will assist in the establishment of a better
relationship between the chief executive and Congress. Many
of the problems and weaknesses within the government today
could be more quickly and easily solved if the members of the
bureaucracy would, simply, look through the "political cloud"
blurring their vision of the real problems at hand.
1. More Realistic Economic Planning Assumptions
When asked, "Would the budget submitted by the
president in January 1990, or for that matter any budget
submitted by the executive branch over the years, successfully
lead to a balanced budget in future years if Congress approved
it as it was written?," Mr. Murray responded:
There was no real rational behind the plan. It was
a useless plan. There was nothing different about [their
plan] than almost any other administration, Democratic or
Republican. So much of [their budget] is extrapolation,
and just based on what [the administration] got last year
and what [the administration] can get away with this year.
[There is] almost no correlation with what it would really
take to do what [the president] announced [his] policy is.
And one of the problems is that when they announce their
pulicy, the policy is so vaguely stated, you don't have
a clear definition of [the policy].
69
69Interview with Mr. Murray.
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Mr. Murray firmly felt that President Bush's budget plan would
not have produced a balanced budget in future years. The
point is America will never know due to the extreme
modification the President's budget proposal goes through
after it arrives at the Capitol.
At the present time, it seems the executive branch
simply wastes its time and effort to formulate a budget, only
to have it chopped to pieces once its submitted to Congress
in January. Much of the reason this occurs is due to the
impediments involved with a Republican president interacting
with a Democratic Congress. However, some of the fault can
be blamed on the poor economic planning assumptions used by
the executive branch to formulate their budget proposal.
Historically, the executive branch has been guilty of
using overly optimistic economic planning assumptions in
developing their short and long-range budget plans. In fact,
as an economic forecaster the OMB has consistently ranked near
the bottom in terms of the accuracy of future predictions.
In a study conducted by Charles Wolf of fifteen leading
economic forecasters between 1983 and 1986 (Table II), OMB
came in last place two out of the four years examined, and
ranked number twelve out of fifteen the other two years. In
the composite ranking of the four years, OMB finished last.
It is also interesting to note the CBO's (OMB's counterpart
in Congress) score in the study. The CBO finished with a
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Table II
ECONOMIC FORECASTERS' RANKINGS, 1983-1986
Composite
1983 1984 1985 1986 1983-7986
Forecaster Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score
Bank of America 14 12 5 8 10
Chase Econometrics 9 8 13 3 6
Data Resources 13 1 1 4 1
Dean Witter 2 13 15 12 12
DuPont 1 9 9 2 3
Evans Economics 15 7 3 14 13
Fortune 3 11 11 11 11
Manufacturers Hanover 11 5 2 10 7
Merrill Lynch 6 14 8 5 8
Morgan Guaranty 10 3 6 7 5
Pennzoil 8 10 14 13 14
Wharton 5 4 10 1 2
Blue Chip Consensus 4 6 7 9 9
OMB 12 15 12 15 15
CBO 7 2 4 6 4
Source: Charles Wolf, Jr.. "Scoring the economic forecasters," The Public Interest
(Summer 1987): 52
composite score of fourth place over the same period, scoring
an impressive 2nd place in 1984.70
It would logically appear preferable, given the
uncertainties involved with economic predictions and the large
amount of money at stake, that one should plan for the most
realistic possible outcomes, vice overly optimistic
assumptions which, in many respects, are only hopes for future
70For more detailed information on the methodology used
and the exact scores obtained, refer to Charles Wolf, Jr.,
"Scoring the economic forecasters," The Public Interest
(Summer 1987): 52.
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economic conditions vice realistic predictions. Lt goes
without saying that most households throughout America budget
for future uncertainties by planning for the worst possible
scenario. Why should the office in charge of developing the
president's budget proposal do just the opposite?
As Figure 1071 illustrates, once again the president's
economic assumptions for the future were more optimistic than
those of Congress. In the areas of GNP, unemployment,
inflation, and the interest rate, OMB's estimates for the
future U.S. economy consistently fell to the more optimistic
side of the CBO's, with a significant difference between
predictions of inflation and interest rates.
There is nothing wrong with striving for the optimum
economic environment for the future. However, one should not
base planning assumptions on unrealistic variables, especially
when the economy of a nation is at stake. If the executive
branch wants Congress to place more credibility on its yearly
budget proposal, then it must become more realistic in its
aspirations for the future.
Likewise, in order to stimulate the executive branch
into submitting more realistic budgets, the Congress must
publicly commit itself to accepting the proposals as valid
economic plans for the nation. For this to happen, there must
be more interaction and cooperation between OMB and CBO
71Office of Management and Budget.
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planners. The elimination of the adversarial relationship
between Congress and the president must begin here.
2. Better Cooperative Planning Between DoD and OMB
The other area where the executive branch must make
procedural improvements is within the interaction between OMB
and DoD. In theory, OMB should be the office which formulates
all the inputs from the president's sources into one very
realistic and workable budget. In terms of defense, OMB
should be matching the economic assumptions and
recommendations from the President's Council of Economic
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Advisors and the Secretary of the Treasury, with the national
security requirements as outlined by DoD.
With the inputs from the various sources at its
disposal, OMB should be able to provide DoD a realistic
projection of the available resources it will have for future
defense needs, which will facilitate the forwarding of a much
more realistic national security plan to Congress. However,
that particular supposition does not hold true.
For years, DoD's 5-year projection of the required
budget authority reeded to fund current and future defense
programs, has consistently been unrealistic in lerms of the
future defense budget projection. In other words, the
required funding to fulfill DoD's 5-year defense plan (FYDP),
and the projections by OMB of future defense spending, have
not been anywhere close to the same dollar amounts. The OMB
and DoD are fully cognizant of this fact, and still it
continues. Why?
Figure 1172 depicts this consistent pattern. DoD's
FYDPs for 1986 through 1989 are represented in terms of their
required resources. Also, the actual defense budget authority
(BA) for the past fiscal years, and the estimate for the
current and future fiscal years is presented. One clearly
notices that the projections are in the opposite direction.
72office of Management and Budget.
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Defense spending will continue to experience a real
decline into the future (barring any major military
confrontation in the Persian Gulf).73 The declining trend of
defense spending is not debated within the executive or
73Defense spending for operation "Desert Shield" is not
considered additional budget authority at the present time,
due to continued debate over where the funding may actually
b- obtained. The Pentagon has estimated it will need about
$15 billion in additional funding for FY-91, but many in
Congress say that estimate is too high. The CBO has roughly
estimated $7.5 to $9.0 billion in IY-91. It is still
uncertain to what degree foreign contributions will offset
costs.
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legislative side of government. Figure 12,74 which was part
of an OMB report to the president at the beginning of the
year, clearly revealed the expected decline in defense
spending for the next five years. Why then shouldn't the FYDP
submitted by DoD not realistically reflect the availability,
or lack of, future resources?
The disparity between the DoD's FYDP and available
resources developed due to the sudden cutback in military
spending after the Reagan build-up in the mid '80's.
Basically, the nation had been on a defense "blue light
special" spending spree, buying everything in sight with not
enough consideration for where or how the equipment would be
used in the future.
The problem will slowly correct itself. As more and
more budget cuts are realized, the two diverging lines
depicted in Figure 11 will slowly come closer together.
Compounding the problem today is the constantly changing
international environment which was discussed in the first
chapter. The solution lies in restructuring the military into
a more efficient and effective fighting force to counter the
realistic threats for the future. The U.S. must first
identify those threats to national security. It is very
evident that at least one resides in the Middle East.
f4Office of Management and Budget.
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C. THE U.S. CONGRESS
1. cooperation with the Executive Branch
There could have been a sub-section included in the
previous section with a title similar to this one. The point
to be made is that there must be more cooperation between the
two branches of government. Naturally, the first thought is
that this is a natural consequence of partisan politics,
especially when opposite parties dominate each branch.
However, the dilemma over the budget summit at the end of
FY-90 illustrated that even the president and the Republican
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leadership of Congress could not influence the political
decisions of their own party members. Republican
Representative Newt Gingrich of Georgia, even lead a coalition
to persuade fellow Republicans not to be influenced by the
president.
In - speech before the Naval Postgraduate School on 6
November 1990, Rear Admiral Flanagan, director of the Office
of Legislative Affairs, firmly stated that this dichotomy was
essential for our democratic system to operate properly. The
pluralistic nature of our governmental system is a major
strength of the democratic process, so long as this partisan
dichotomy is due to the desires of the nation's citizens being
voiced in Congress by their representatives. If the friction
surfacing from the House or Senate is simply due to the
representatives steadfast objection to differing political
beliefs, possibly from members of their own party, then the
dichotomy is dysfunctional. Whatever the case, in order for
the democratic system to continue to operate effectively and
maintain its strength, political compromises will have to be
made.
As we noticed in Arrow's study, it is extremely
difficult for a democratic system to exactly reflect the
wishes of all the members of the group, or of society.
Therefore, it is virtually impossible to completely satisfy
the desires of every citizen in the U.S. Objections to
congressional resolutions will continue to be voiced
93
throughout the country despite efforts by their congressmen
to represent their concerns.
As more special interest groups, minorities, and
differing political philosophies are represented and elected
to Congress, the difficulty in reaching a satisfactory
consensus will continue to magnify itself. It will
increasingly become more diffizult to arrive at a solution
that represents the desires of everyone. Given this arduous
dilemma facing the elected officials, it is even more
important for the elected leadership to be cognizant of this
fact, and aware of the potential problems before they surface.
By "cooperation," this is not to suggest that both
branches should share the Fame political beliefs, for such an
ideal would completely go against the principles by which the
government has iperated since its conception. In this context
"cooperation" means there should be more interaction between
the two branches to define particular issues where obvious
differences exist in the fundamental definition of problems.
a. The Federal Deficit
An example of the ambiguity described above is
illustrated in FiQure 13. Of fundamental concern to the
nation, as indicated by the increased media attention and
public interest in the situation, is the federal deficit
facing the country. It was just reported that the federal
75office of Management and Budget.
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government began fiscal 1991 with a $31.5 billion deficit for
October, which was 21 percent higher than the $26.1 billion
deficit of October 1989. According to the Treasury
Department, the increase reflects the buildup of forces in the
Persian Gulf, and increased costs in the savings and loan
bailout. Richard Darman, director of the OMB, said he
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expected the 1991 budget deficit to fall between $250 and $300
billion, more if a war starts with Iraq.
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The uncertainty lies with the exact measurement of
the deficit. Just exactly what is counted in the deficit
figures, and what isn't? Figure 13 shows the OMB's projection
of the "budget deficit" at the beginning of 1990 (illustrated
by the solid lines, one including the social security surplus
funds and the other without), and the total federal funds
deficit (depicted by the dash line where none of the various
trust fund surpluses are counted).
In August 1990, Richard Darman projected the FY-
90 federal deficit to be $170 billion if the S&L bailout is
not counted, and $232 billion if the bailout is included.
Then in September, Darman said the new top figure would be
closer to $250 billion. The question remains, what do we
count? Senator Moynihan raised concern earlier in the year
over counting the social security surplus toward offsetting
the federal deficit. Moynihan said it was not fair to the
American people.
Here is an example of one particular area where the
executive and legislative branches could cooperate more
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"October deficit hits $31.5 billion; record budget gap
predicted in '91," San Jose Mercury News, 24 November 1990,
8C.
7David E. Rosenbaum, "With Time Running Out, Budget
Negotiators Prepare for Heavy Bargaining," The New York Times,
6 September 1990, A16 (N).
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effectively, by arriving at a definitive determination on
exactly what will be included in the deficit total, and what
will not. It only seems logical that before attempting to
reduce the federal deficit there should be a clear definition
of what is included in its figure.
b. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Legislation
The other ambiguity facing the decision-makers
today is that of how to actually reduce the deficit. The
original Gramm-Rudman-Hollinas ( -R-H) legislatioii adopted in
1985 would, in theory, have provided a balanced budget in FY-
7891 (see Figure 14). However, the G-R-H targets were revised
in 1987, amending the balanced budget target to 1993.
It has become apparent that further modification
of the G-R-H targets will be required to prevent drastic cuts
in defense and domestic programs at the beginning of FY-92.
As was mentioned above, Darman has already said he expected
a $250 billion to $300 billion budget gap at the end of FY-91.
Therefore, to comply with G-R-H legislation, $222 billion to
$272 billion would have to be eliminated from the FY-92 budget
to meet the $28 billion G-R-H target for 1992 and prevent
automatic spending cuts from going into effect, a far greater
amount than the approximate $85 billion required this year.
The original concept behind G-R-H, which was to
force the government to become more responsible in balancing
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the budget, may be debated as to its original value or current
necessity. However, the present targets are unrealistic given
the present state of the economy, and will require further
modification if it is to remain in effect. The Congress can
not afford a mandatory spending cut of anywhere near $220
billion. When one examines the discretionary and non-
discretionary numbers in the budget, it is easy to see the
restrictive latitude the lawmakers have in trying to find
dollars to cut.
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Out of the President's 1991 budget prcpcczl, only
$121.1 billion, out of the total proposed $306.4 billion for
military programs, was subject to cutbacks. Those military
programs exempt included such items as contracts already
awarded, maintenance of the Pentagon, and military personnel
expenses.
As for the domestic programs, only $228.5 billion
of the total proposed $964.7 billion would be subject to cuts.
Domestic programs exempt from the hatchet include such things
as social security, federal retirement, disability, workers
compensation, medicare, food stamps, and net interest (just
to name a few).
7 9
Many people immediately equate such things as
defense spending, tax cuts, and government waste to the poor
fiscal condition of the country. However, some see the
problem as the U.S.' commitment to the elderly. Social
security has grown to be one of the largest components of the
federal budget. As Rudolph Penner, economist for the Urban
Institute in Washington, stated:
The New Deal commitment to the elderly was by far the
single most important budget event of the 20th Century.
Virtually the entire growth in the civilian, non-interest
budget has been related to our commitment to the elderly.
80
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"What Could Be Cut," The New York Times, 20 September
1990, A15 (N).
80Quoted in Gary Blonston, "Budget-gobbling programs for
elderly bloat U.S. debt," San Jose Mercury News, 20 September
1990, 1A. Blonston added that Social Security totalled nearly
$250 billion, Medicare was nearly half that amount, and if
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Whether or not G-R-H was necessary before any real
progress toward balancing the budget would have been made by
Congress, is questionable. What isn't questionable at this
point is that the legislation doesn't appear to be sufficient
to achieve a balanced budget alone. It would appear that
there are other variables affecting the federal balance sheet
which simply can not be controlled by prescribed deficit
targets.
G-R-H can be credited with forcing the government
to seriously examine the federal deficit issue. It is sad
that it actually required legislation to stress its importance
to the lawmakers. As Dr. Jack R. Borsting, dean of the School
of Business Administration at the University of Southern
California, stated in a recent interview:
From a rational standpoint, you have to say that you
shouldn't have Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. It was not a good
way to balance the budget. From a practical sort of way,
maybe its been okay. At least, it tried to get some
discipline [into the system]. But it is far from perfect
in even getting discipline, because the people get around
it. They put things off-budget to get out of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings ceilings.
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the other elderly programs were added, the total came to $427
billion last year.
81Dr. Jack R. Borsting, Dean of the School of Business
Administration at the University of Southern California,
interviewed by author, 26 October 1990, Los Angeles,
Californ-a, tape recorded. Prior to his current position at
USC, Dr. Borsting was Dean of the School of Business
Administration at the University of Miami and Professor of
Management Science. He has also served as Assistant Secretary
of Defense in the position of Comptroller for the U.S.
Department of Defense.
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It is obvious that changes must be made. Congress
must choose between three options in the coming year:
" proceed under the current targets in hopes that the fiscal
deficit will not develop as forecast due to some miracle
during the year;
" adopt a new revision to the G-R-H legislation which will
set new target deficits for the next five years,
postponing a balanced budget until 1997; or
• abolish G-R-H legislation in favor of a more responsible
approach by all concerned, both in the Pxecutive and
legislative branches, toward constrained spending and
increased revenues.
If option two is chosen, Congress should abolish
the five year time period required for a balanced budget.
The most important consideration should be the trend of the
deficit, not the actual amount. The foremost consideration
should be reducing the growing deficit numbers, while
maintaining a healthy and growing economic environment.
Therefore, extend the time period to between six to ten years
for a balanced budget, to permit more realistic goal setting
without jeopardizing the state of the economy.
In effect, the Congress has already adopted the
latter option. By agreeing to the five-year, $500 billion
deficit reduction package in October, Congress has set aside
the G-R-H legislation for the time being, as long as they
fulfill the requirements of the new package. However, some
experts feel the new package is too optimistic in its economic
assumptions, and too restrictive in its requirements. As
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Carol Cox, director of the Committee for a Responsible Federal
Budget, stated:
For the first time, we're going to have meaningful
expenditure controls in this country . . . I don't think
most members of Congress actually realize what they have
done to themselves. Legislative bodies hate spending
discipline.
In the same article, Joseph White, a Brookings Institution
analyst, stated:
The idea that this deficit-reduction package will have a
favorable short-term effect is certainly dubious . .
And while it may modestly improve the economy over the
longer run, the notion that it will lead to a great new
era of economic growth is even more doubtful.
82
The United States, despite its fiscal deficit,
maintains the strongest economy of any nation in the world.
Renewed attention to the U.S.' trade relations and industrial
base, both civilian and defense related, coupled with the
responsible management of federal spending and revenues, will
eventually lead to a decrease in the deficit and promote
continued economic growth over time.
This may appear to be too optimistic, or
idealistic, in dealing with the deficit dilemma, however,
there are variables affecting the budget that can not be
influenced by the establishment of mandated deficit targets.
The past five years has proven that point. The future
82Quoted in Tom Redburn, "Analysts Doubt That Plan Would
Yield Balanced Budget by Mid-'90s," Los Angeles Times, 26
October 1990, A23.
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problems confronting both the president and Congress should
not be compounded by the annual impasse over the budget.
2. "Macro" vice "Micro" Management of the Budget
Probably the one single change Congress could make
which would yield the greatest improvement in terms of
streamlining the budgetary process, would be the adoption of
a more "macromanagement" policy, vice the detailed
"micromanagement" policy which has prevailed in recent years.
In order to realize more long-term stability in the defense
planning and budgeting process, and also assist in the
strengthening of the industrial base, the detailed examination
and modification of the federal budget each year by Congress
needs to end.
As pointed out in a White Paper on the Department of
Defense and the Congress:
The microscopic focus of the budget review is
evidenced by the number of line-item adjustments Congress
makes to the defense authorization and appropriation
bills. . . . appropriations line-item adjustments doubled
during the 1970s and then grew by another 85% between 1982
and 1987. Authorization adjustments grew more slowly
during the 1970s, but took a quantum leap between 1982 and
1985, almost quadrupling in four years.
• . . The 1977 budget justification ran 12,350 pages. For
1988, the justification took 30,114 pages--almost two and
a half times as many pages as eleven years earlier. The
fact that no one person can comprehend this material in
total contributes to a myopic and disjointed review
process 83
83Report to the President by the Secretary of Defense,
White Paper on the Department of Defense and the Congress,
January 1990, 6.
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The real problem behind the increase in the micromanagement
of the budget is the increase in the number of congressional
staff personnel. From 1955 to 1985, the congressional staff
personnel grew from approximately 5,000 to 20,000. From 1960
to 1985, the total congressional committee staff grew by 237
percent, and personal staffs grew by 175 percent.85 This large
staff permits a more detailed account of the various line
items within the budget. Dr. Borsting commented:
The Congress, with the large staff that they have, have
become too "micro." They should be "macro" policy-
makers, and they the check and balance of government. .
. I think it was on the '81 appropriations report that
the Congress had in there that we shouldn't be doing some
painting of government vehicles in Hawaii. There was that
level of detail.8
Another major problem which developed because of the
congressional micromanagement, is the required time spent
preparing for and testifying before the multitude of
committees within Congress. As Gansler wrote:
In 1983, 1,306 DoD witnesses testified, for 2,160 hours,
in hearings before 96 committees and subcommittees (a 357
percent increase since 1975). In that same year, there
were approximately 85,000 written congressional budget
inquiries to the DoD, and 21,753 pages of supporting
documents were submitted by the DoD to justify the fiscal
1984 budget request (an increase of over 300 percent since
1975). 87
B4Gansler, Affording Defense, 110.
85White Paper on the Department of Defense and the
ConQress, 8-9.
8Interview with Dr. Borsting.
87Gansler, 113-114.
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Figure 15
As a consequence, much of the testimony before the
congressional committees is redundant. Even though there are
a number of different committees examining the same line items
in the budget, the coordination between the committees is
poor. Therefore, conflicts often occur due to simultaneous
adjustments to the budget.
As Figure 15 illustrates, there are at least 14 points
in the annual legislative process where a single program's
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budget can be adjusted, not counting the budget resolution.8
Congress must find some way to decrease the amount of time
required of DoD personnel to appear before the large number
of committees, while at the same time, reducing the redundancy
in committee jurisdiction and investigation.
This problem is certainly not a new one, and certainly
is not an easy one to solve. It requires coordination between
the various House and Senate committee staffs to combine
hearings wherever possible.89 This concept is most difficult
because of the authority which must be relinquished as
committee chairmen grant privileges and authority to outside
parties.
3. Stabilization of Defense Spending
The U.S. must stabilize its defense spending practices
if it truly desires to realize tangible savings over the long-
term, and make concrete progress toward rebuilding the
industrial base. The defense budget has been declining for
the last five years as a percentage of GNP (see Table III),
and as a percentage of total federal outlays, defense spending
has been in a downward spiral since Vietnam.
8White Paper on the Department of Defense and the
Congress, 21.
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In 1965, defense accounted for 43 percent of federal
spending. Other non-defense programs (space, education,
national parks, etc.) accounted for about 22 percent, and
payments to individuals (social security, disability,
retirement, etc.) totalled about 28 percent. Last year, the
payments to individuals had climbed to 47 percent of total
federal outlays, while defense had decreased to around 26
percent.90 As Table III illustrates, these declining trends
90Blonston, 18A.
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are projected to continue, at least for the next five years,
and may possibly continue well into the future.
It is difficult to attract new companies into the
defense sector, both at the primary contractor level, and at
the lower sub-contractor and part-supplier levels, when the
projections for future defense spending are so discouraging.
It is also difficult to entertain the current defense
contractors (especially those who have a life outside the
defense sector) into maintaining some level of interest for
future employment when such grim outlooks for future military
spending permeate throughout government.
If one plots out defense spending over the last forty
years, the inconsistency of the defense budget becomes readily
apparent (see Figure 16). Although some of the irregular
anomalies in military spending can be explained by national
crises, the uncertainty of other years can also be
distinguished. It has already been discussed that the current
and future momentum of military spending is in a downward
trend. However, just how long will that trend continue?
As mentioned earlier in this paper, if history has
taught the American leadership and people anything, it should
be that whenever the international environment seemed secure
enough to permit cuts in defense spending, the nation has
later found it necessary to redirect federal spending in order
to reassemble an appropriate national security posture. The











1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year
- Defense Spending
Source: William W. Kiufmann. "A Plan to Cut Military Spending in Half."
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1990): 37.
Figure 16
be a matter of time before attention is once again focused on
the depletion of national security (it may be even sooner if
the crisis in the Persian Gulf is not peacefully resolved).
Why must the U.S. follow this erratic cycle?
Using the same data from Fiqure 16, if the trend in
military spending is plotted over the same period (see Figure
17), a much more consistent pattern emerges. Roughly
speaking, the trend depicted in Fiqure 17 equates to a real
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U.S. MILITARY SPENDING TREND
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growth rate over the last forty years of less than 1 percent.91
Therefore, if the assumption was made (and agreed to by both
branches of government) that military spending should follow
a real growth rate of 1 percent, the dilemma over how much to
spend for defense would be much easier to solve each year.
With such a system, the amount allocated to defense
would have to depend on the most up-to-date forecast of the
91By approximating the figure off the trend line in 1950
to be $240 billion, and the approximate amount in 1990 to be
$280 billion, the real growth rate over the period would equal
0.39 percent. This is not, by any means, an exact
extrapolation of the data, nor is it intended to be.
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nation's economic growth. In order to alleviate unnecessary
bickering over the projected amount, the economic forecast
would have to be agreed to and obtained through the
cooperation of both the OMB and CBO.
The established growth rate of defense spending would
have to be negotiated and agreed to by the president and
Congress. However, the establishent of some consistent
pattern of military spending would inject stability into the
defense budget, and more confidence into the defense
industrial base. Certainly from a national security
perspective, the larger the share allocated for defense the
better. Nonetheless, a consistent pattern of only 1 percent
real growth will largely contribute to a reversal of the
detrimental effects caused by the present unpredicta i-ty of
the defense budget.
4. Stabilization of Procurement Numbers
The U.S. government wastes millions of dollars each
year due to stretch-outs in defense programs. This is
especially true during periods of decreasing defense budgets.
As more pressure is applied, both by the people and the
government, to cut military spending, the tendency is to look
for short-term savings vice the efficiency of long-term
investments. Another bad habit of government is its
unwillingness to totally cut or postpone defense programs.
11i
When faced with the task of cutting the defense
budget, the tendency has been to simply reduce the number of
items procured, rather than maintain the level of procurement
originally planned. By stretching out the programs, the
per-unit cost of each individual -s,,tem (i.e., tank, airplane,
missile, etc.) goes up as the overhead costs are redistributed
among fewer products.
The most publicized example of this phenomencn over
the past years has been the continued cutbacks in the number
of B-2 stealth bombers the Pentagon and Congress are willing
to buy. In April of this year, Secretary Cheney reduced the
planned number of B-2 aircraft to be procured in FY-91 from
132 to 75. This raised the per-unit cost of each plane from
approximately $530 million to $865 million.92 Therefore, based
on these numbers, f r FY-91 the Pentagon would spend $64.8
billion, vice $69.9 billion for the B-2. This equates to a
short-term savings of $5.1 billion for FY-91. However, if the
total number of B-2 aircraft originally planned to be procured
is realized in the future, the total cost of the program will
be much higher than if the original procurement schedule had
been maintained.
The defense companies themselves would prefer to
maintain the originally intended procurement schedule, despite
9 Eric Schmitt, "Star Wars and Stealth Bomber Given
Limited Funds in Accord," The New York Times, 18 October 1990,
Al (N).
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the fact that they will inevitably raise the per-unit cost of
each system to cover their expenses. As in the case of the
B-2, Northrop has not exactly benefited from the publicity
received each time it has been forced to raise the B-2's cost
due to the Pentagon's decisions to cut procurement numbers.
Dr. Roche of the Northrop Corporation, made the following
recommendations for the procurement process:
" Kill [programs] early. Don't drag [programs] on and then
have all kinds of investments on the part of companies,
and then wind up not being able to [follow through with
original plans].
" If you're not going to kill them early, pay the companies
to [procure one program, not enter into competition for
different programs]. Competition at every level had its
own inherent stupidity.
" If you decide to build the program, stabilize the funding.
" If you don't want that many things produced, you may have
to pay up front for an inefficient buy, in terms of
inefficient order quantities, but with the option to
produce more. That's not what the [U.S. does]. We price
things at some volume, an efficient rate, and then we beat
the hell out of the companies, or the Congress beats the
hell out of the services, when we don't procure them at
that rate.
Concerning the B-2 per-unit cost, Dr. Roche also stated:
The biggest price increase in the B-2 had absolutely
nothing to do with the B-2. It had to do with the rate
at which they're being acquired.
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Table IV illustrates five examples of how production
stretch-outs raise the per-unit procurement costs. In each
case listed, the total production costs over the measured
93Interview with Dr. Roche.
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period (1983-1987) was less than originally planned. However,
as in the case of the Patriot missile system, the actual
savings over the five year period only totaled $158.2 million,
while the per-unit cost of each system went up by 68 percent.
As in this example, one has to weigh the advantage of saving
$158.2 million over the five year period, with the
significantly lower number of weapon systems in the U.S.'
inventory due to cutbacks in the procurement schedule.
The U.S. government must strive to stabilize its
defense systems procurement rate. This will require a
commitment by Congress to authorize funding over the life of
a contract, and adhere to its production schedule. The
Congress is well aware of this problem and has considered a
plan for "milestone budgeting" to assist with the problem.
94
"Milestone budgeting" would identify stages within the life
of a defense program where a review of its progress would be
required. Thus, the process of reviewing each program during
the yearly budget negotiations would, ideally, decline to only
include those programs which have reached a particular
milestone.
"Milestone budgeting" would not guarantee program
stability, because Congress would always retain the option to
revisit particular programs. However, it may provide the
94See U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office,
AssessinQ the Effectiveness of Milestone Budgeting, Washington
D.C.: GPO, July 1987.
114
Table IV
COSTS OF PRODUCTION STRETCHOUTS
FISCAL YEARS 1983-1987
Total
Total 1983-1987 Cost Procurement Unit
1983-1987 (In millions of Cost (In millions
System Quantity FY-83 dollars) of FY-82 dollars)
F/A- 18
Planned 552 11,772.0 21.3
Actual 420 10,367.8 24.7
SH-60B
Planned 186 2,828.3 15.2
Actual 107 1,834.5 17.1
Sparrow
Planned 13,705 1,690.7 0.12
Actual 10,099 1,539.8 0.15
Patriot
Planned 3,742 4,064.9 1.09
Actual 2,427 3,906.7 1.61
F-15
Planned 390 10,204.0 26.2
Actual 207 7,124.4 34.4
Source: U.S. Congress. Congressional Budget Office. Assessing the Effectiveness of Milestone Budgeting.
(Washington D.C.: GPO]. July 19B7.
necessary incentive to maintain the originally agreed to
production schedule, both by Congress and the defense
contractor. The CBO estimated that "production stretch-outs
between 1981 and 1984 added an average of $4 billion (in
budget authority) each year to total acquisition costs."95 At
a time when every dollar counts, Congress should be searching





This thesis has attempted to point out particular
deficiencies within the budgetary process which have a
detrimental effect on the U.S.' national security posture.
It has also presented some recommendations by which to correct
those deficiencies. The process of physical change within an
established system of government is difficult to implement,
especially one as diverse anO complex as ours. However, in
such a pluralistic form of government, a significant degree
of positivP change may develop from, nothing more, than a
realization of the need for change within the decision-making
membership.
We noted the complexities incorporated into our
governmental process at the time of conception by the founding
fathers. The U.S. Constitution was written with the intent
to fragment the powers of government. This separation of
powers inherently placed enormous constraints on the
functioning of both the legislative and executive branches.
However, these same constraints can be credited with providing
the strength which produced the most stable and powerful
government in the world.
Changes in the decision-making structure, and membership
within that structure, will produce changes in policy. An
important point one should consider is the minimal impact of
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these changes on our governmental system as a whole.
Presidents and congressmen come and go with elections, but our
governmental foundation remains firm. The constitutional
structure adopted over 200 years ago is the infrastructure by
which the citizens temporarily operate their country. It is
structurally unyielding to withstand the unending change of
occupants, however, flexible enough to allow a pluralistic
adaptation to changes in domestic and international
priorities.
As was noted earlier by William J. Baumol's analysis of
Kenneth J. Arrow's theorem on group decision-making, the
dilemma facing the congressional representatives, over how to
successfully represent the desires of their constituents, will
not be easily solved. It will only continue to become more
difficult as special interest groups and minorities gain more
control in Congress.
The current problems facing the nation, coupled with the
difficulty of reaching a consensus within government, are even
more troubling. In an era of such sweeping change throughout
the international system, and increased pressure at home to
realize some sort of "peace dividend," four particular budget
issues were identified which, if left alone, may weaken the
U.S.' national security posture:
• The perception of a reduced threat to U.S. national
security, and the associated political pressure to reduce
defense spending.
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" The deterioration of the U.S.' overall defense posture due
to impulsive defense cuts without a viable long-range
defense strategy.
" The impact of cutbacks in defense spending on the already
neglected and deteriorating defense industrial base.
" The deterioration of the U.S.' technological superiority
due to cutbacks in research and development expenditures,
and through the transfer of technology to competing
countries.
The eradication of the above issues, and the refurbishment
of the system will not be easy. However, the most important
element of the process must be the cooperation between both
branches of government, and between the elected leadership
and DoD. Without full cooperation and coordination between
all the parties, the benefits of the efforts by one
participant will only meet the unyielding bureaucratic barrier
of the others.
The Pentagon must strive to re-establish the confiaence
of Congress and the American people. The only means by which
this will occur is if DoD continues to purge illicit behavior
throughout the defense industry. It must also endeavor to
operate more efficiently through continued reorganization of
its defense management practices.
Realism must be injected into the defense planning and
budgetary process. This will require a cooperative effort
between OMB, CBO and DoD. There must be more interaction
between OMB and DoD to determine the realistic quantity of
resources available for defense, and promulgate that
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information throughout the Pentagon to promote a more
pragmatic and effective planning process. This effort will
result in the formulation of a much more precise and effectual
defense budget for the president to submit to Congress.
The micromanagement of the budget, particularly the
defense budget, by the congressional staff must be eliminated.
The Congress must adopt a "macro" perspective of dealing with
budgetary issues. One method of dealing with this problem is
to enforce a freeze on further increases in congressional
staff personnel, holding the number at the current levels.
A more effective policy would be to reduce the current level
of staff positions, thus reducing the ability of Congress to
consider every line item in the budget.
Partisan politics must be placed aside for the overall
welfare of the nation. The adversarial relationship which
permeates between parties seems to cloud the vision of
American decision-makers, preventing them from electing that
course of action which would benefit the overall prosperity
of the country. There must be a more cooperative relationship
between the executive and legislative branches of government,
no matter what political parties dominate each.
Now more than ever, American policy should turn inward to
examine our own fundamental practices and well-being, while
working feverishly to re-institute the principles and
competitiveness that originally built this nation. The U.S.
must work diligently to rebuild its own industrial base, the
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same economic base that placed the U.S. in a position of
leadership throughout much of the twentieth century. Instead
of whining over unfair trade practices by foreign countries,
the U.S. should be searching for methods to repair the
deficiencies that created the interdependency on other
countries in the first place. The U.S.' attention for the
'90s should be on our own economic problems, vice worrying
about the economic problems, or the strengths of other
countries around the world.
The U.S. national security may be defined by a variety of
different methods. The concept itself is broad and subject
to an assortment of differing interpretations, each unique to
individual perceptions of importance. This paper has
attempted to prejudice opinions on those budgetary issues
important for the future security of the United States. Its
purpose was to point out significant problems that should be
on the minds of governmental decision-makers and Pentagon
analysts in the development of the future defense spending
strategy. There are, without doubt, many other considerations
to be factored into the equation, all of which have their own
specific role in the grand strategy of national defense. The
dilemma becomes finding the proper mix of budgetary variables
to satisfy the will of the people, while also maintaining the
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